3.79 Fall and Rise of China: Russo-Japanese War #6: Liaoyang

Last time we spoke about theJapanese advance to Liaoyang. After the loss at Telissu, the Russians began to scramble to defend multiple locations in Manchuria. With multiple Japanese armies advancing simultaneously, Kuropatkin could not be sure where they would hit next and found himself making matters worse when he ordered troops to hold too many places. The Russian losses at Tashihciao, the passes a Fenshuiling and Motien, Chiaotou, Hsimucheng, Tawan, and Yangtzuling. The Russians were in disarray, trying to delay so more troops could gather at Liaoyang and Mukden, but their efforts were being trampled upon. Even out at sea, Admiral Witgeft made and attempt to break out and join up with the Vladivostok Squadron, but was likewise forced to pull back. Now multiple Japanese armies would converge to smash Liaoyang, Manchuria was being slowly conquered city by city.    #79 The Russo-Japanese War part 6: The Battle of Liaoyang    Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Russians had just been severed multiple defeats. Not a single one of Kuropatkins formations had been spared the humiliation. A times correspondent had this to say ‘There is such a thing as the tradition of defeat, and unenviable is the army that creates it.” The commander of the European 17th corps, General Baron Bildering was appointed commander of the Eastern Front. In addition to his 17th corps, he received the 3rd Siberian army corps and the 10th corps. The two opposing armies spent three weeks skirmishing with another over the course of 6 mountainous miles. On the 3rd of August, Haicheng that had so much attention and effort dedicated to it, was entered with little opposition. The Russians had spent so much time at Haicheng, building up its fortifications and expected a battle that never took place. To make matters worse, so much supplies had been brought over to Haicheng, the Russians did not have enough time to destroy or move it all, so the Japanese took it all as a prize. The 1st, 2nd and 4th IJA met at Haicheng as Kuropatkins front was reduced from 140 to 45 miles. The Russian main body was now deployed along the railway at Anshanchan, 22 miles northeast of Haicheng and around 20 miles west of Liaoyang. The war took its toll on Kuropatkin by this point. If you ever heard the memes about what US presidents look like before and after presidency, its kind of a similar situation. Kuropatkin was said to be unrecognizable by August of 1904, he had that 1000 mile stare. Kuropatkin sat huddled in a carriage riding through Liaoyang, not even acknowledging or looking at men who saluted him. Kuropatkin was a experienced military man, he had worked in numerous political positions, a very distinguished figure, and he was quite broken. The Japanese were consolidating and advancing upon Liaoyang. His overcaution, lack of determination, a gradual erosion of his confidence in the face of a growing admiration for the enemy were losing him the war. Kuropatkin cabled the Tsar that he had withdrawn from Haicheng to Liaoyang because “The Japanese superiority in numbers. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger, carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack transport. Their energetic and intelligent leadership. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and the lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance of what we were fighting for)” This telegram sounds a lot to me like someone simply stating “they are better than us sir”. Its pure defeatism, and completely unwarranted mind you, the war was not lost by a large margin. Now Liaoyang was a city holding a population of roughly 60,000. The railway had a north-south-west-east junction at Liaoyang and the Taitzu river ran north of the city. It was a walled city, and by this point held around three lines of defense running some 40 miles long, something Kuropatkin called his zone of maneuver. The railway line running south from Harbin remained the Russians only line of communication while the Japanese had the benefit of two lines. Liaoyang was a vital junction not just for rail, but also for roads. The old mandarin road ran up the west coast of the Liaodong peninsula and Port Arthur, both passed through places like Liaoyang before going to Korea. The Taitzu river is a tributary of the Liao river flowing east and west into the sea. There are 3 important tributaries; the Lan and Tang rivers east of Liaoyang and the Sha river to her south. The battlefield of Liaoyang would have the mandarin roads on the flat open plains of the Liao valley to the west. Here there was abundant kaoliang, over 9 feet tall offering coverage. To the east of the Mandarin roads, spurs rose up to taller mountains. Within the city the railway station was sitting near the northwest wall. The station was constantly receiving materials of war and troops. Nearby to the railway station was the Russian HQ. Despite the incoming battle the Russians allowed normal civilian life to go by, yet again allowing the numerous Japanese spies to do their work. Kuropatkins troops busied themselves with vodka and women, even his chief of staff was allowed time off to be with his girlfriend as Kuropatkin shouldered the additional work. The battle of Liaoyang was to be a decisive battle, something Kuropatkin wrote himself in his memoirs. If the Russians lost, their communication lines in China would be cut, the resources of the Liao plan would be lost, something their interior economy depended upon and of course Port Arthur would be even more in trouble. Kuropatkin did all he could to delay the enemy so he could build up forces at Liaoyang, if it fell all was left was Mukden.  On August 3rd, Kuropatkin and Alexeiev met at Liaoyang. Both men understood the threat the Japanese advance meant. Alexeiev wanted a an offensive to be made against the 1st IJA, whereupon Kuropatkin was forced to speak to him like a toddler about the reality of the situation. The string of defeats had destroyed the Russian morale, they lacked sufficient officers, their strength was both qualitatively and quantitatively less than the enemy. Alexeiev would depart believing he had achieved some sort of compromise with Kuropatkin to get him to agree to fight at Liaoyang, but of course this was what Kuropatkin sought regardless. Liaoyang was to be defended by three lines of defense. The innermost line ran close to the city, anchored across the river on the northern bank. The line held 8 forts with 130 old pattern guns all dug in. Flank protection, obstacles, ditches and tons of cover provided an impressive line of defense. This defense line was watched and mapped by Chinese spies working for Lt Colonel Isauma. Its number one weakness was some high ground 6 miles south east of it. If the high ground was seized, artillery could be placed upon it to ran down fire upon the city and railway station. The next line of defense  ran a radius of 7 miles from the city. The line went from Manju Yama in the northeast to a feature 693 feet high overlooking the railway. The outermost line this was about 15 miles out going from Anshanchan to Anping. The line was not as strong as the inner line, but offered substantial obstacles against the enemy.  The Russians believed the Japanese would perform two basic courses of action. The first would be to turn a flank, the second to throw a frontal attack against the successive lines of defense. To turn a flank, the Japanese would need to cross a river, leaving them very vulnerable to Russian counter attacks provided by their reserves. The Japanese frontal attack would progressively exhaust itself, setting up counter strokes. The battle would be the first time the leaders of each side would be directly commanding. The Japanese troops were confident, well practiced and yet to be served a real defeat. Despite the losses, Kuropatkins withdrawals were performed perfectly, this battle was quite open to either side winning. The Russians divided themselves into three groups; the southern group, eastern group and reserves. General Zarubaiev led the southern group consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Siberian corps entrenched at Anshanchan. 10 miles south of his position were the advanced guards with the army reserve taken from all 3 corps. Amongst them were 11 cavalry squadrons and 6 guns under General Mishchenko. Baron Bildering led the eastern group consisting of the 3rd Siberian and 10th european corps. They were deployed in a semicircle between the Tang and Taitzu. To the left of the Taitzu was brigade of the 17th corps. A bridge connected this detachment to the main body. The reserves were at Liaoyang under Kuropatkins command, they consisted of 30 battalions taken from the 2nd siberians and 17th corps. Over at Mukden were the recently arrived 5th Siberian corps of which 8 battalions were ordered to advance to the Taitzu river to guard the left flank. Also at Mukden were elements of the 1st european corps. The Russians took specific care to guard their flanks and railway, but most of the detachments were in the east, while approaches from the west were somewhat neglected. At this point in the war, there was a large possibility China might enter the war on Japan’s side. This indeed was something Kuropatkin wrote about often, but it had major consequences. If China entered the war it would most likely draw in France, which would draw in Britain both of whom would seek to end hostilities. Such a situation would be against Japan’s interests, Japan was actively doing everything she could to stop the Chinese from such actions, but publicly Japan fanned rumors using her spy network. Such rumors spoke of how General Ma had gathered a 30,000 strong force along the western borders of Manchuria. Other rumors spoke of a Japanese army landing at Yingkou to join forces with a large Honghuzi force. On top of the rumor filled paranoia, Kuropatkin had some bad intelligence. He believed the Japanese outnumbered them heavily, but in reality he had some 158,000 men and Commander in Chief of the IJA, Iwao Oyama held 125,000. The Russians had the numbers, Oyama enjoyed perfect intelligence on this and he knew every day they grew. Thus Oyama ordered his commanders to keep grabbing the initiative, because if they did not the Russians would soon overwhelm them. Meanwhile something else deeply concerned Oyama, Nogi was besieging Port Arthur and things were going terribly. Oyama had hoped Port Arthur would fall before he tossed the kitchen sink at Liaoyang, but he could wait no longer.  Kuropatkin’s cavalry which he referred to as “old men on little horses” were not living up to what he thought they should be. He relied upon them for intelligence and they over exaggerated everything. His cavalry was three times larger than the Japanese, they should have been crushing them in every battle. Now every day that passed by was a victory for the Russians, already the 5th Siberians at Vladivostok were being diverted to Liaoyang, time was everything. Kuropatkin planned to hold the line between Anshanchan and Anping with a strong covering force, 3 corps strong. He planned to hold back some reserves and hit to Japanese when they began a frontal attack and this strategy did not sit well with Generals like Bildering or Sluchevski. Both generals did not like the idea of fighting in front of an unfordable river and advised pulling the entire force back to Liaoyangs inner defense. Sluchevski took this a step further recommending they take up a new defensive position between Mukden and Liaoyang. Kuropatkin wrote this in his memoirs “These officers reiterated the same opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of moving their troops towards Liaoyang became greatly increased by the heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port Arthur, by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stoessel’s highly alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist the fortress and make an advance of some sort – though it were only a demonstration – towards Haicheng. “ Kuropatkin messaged the Tsar about the conflicting ideas, and the Tsar replied that he acting as the commanding general knew best and would decide what was to be done, not his subordinates. On the 7th of August Kuropatkin told Bildering that they would fight a decisive battle and it would be along the Anshanchan-Anping line. However two days later Kuropatkin instructed the commander of the 3rd Siberians, General Ivanov that his job was to only act as rearguards and not enter into the foray of battle. Ivanov was bewildered by this and sought further clarification to which Kuropatkin said “‘They were to avoid a desperate struggle and simultaneously to hold their positions and gain time, but to retreat to the main defences at Liaoyang if seriously attacked, without permitting themselves to be demoralised or disorganised.” Thus Ivanov basically planned for a retreat from the line before any fighting was to be had. Then on August the 23rd Kuropatkin changed his mind completely and reaffirmed the decisive battle would be fought on the Anshanchan-Anping line, he wrote this to Sluchevski who was commanding the 10th corps “Under these circumstances, I do not think we need confine ourselves to fighting rearguard actions in the positions occupied by the Tenth and Third Siberian Army Corps and by the troops on the southern front. I am resolved to fight in those positions with all the forces apportioned to their defence, to beat the enemy back and to assume the offensive should a favourable opportunity present itself. “ It seems the Russian intelligence throughout August bolstered Kuropatkin. There were reports the 2nd IJA relinquished 3-4 divisions to help at Port Arthur, this of course was not true and most likely fed to the Russian by Japanese spies. There was another report 30-40 thousand Japanese in Oku’s army were facing a cholera outbreak, again not true. It seemed to the Russians the Japanese were at the moment at least performing defense in front of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin instructed Sluchevski to prepare a possible offensive should an opportunity present itself, but reaffirmed Bildering and Zarubaiev they would maintain their positions. Thus the outer defensive line changed a bit, something that would aid Oyama.  On the Japanese side they wargamed a few options before them. Everything did not look good on the board and ultimately they decided to pursue a simple course of action. They would exert pressure across the whole Russian line until the combined force could initiate a converging attack. At this point Oyama would decide whether they hit left, center or right. From his HQ at Haicheng, Oyama ordered his forces to drive the Russians from their forward position to their main position hopefully by August 28th. The 1st IJA was to advance west of the Tang river; the 4th IJA would advance against the main Russian line by the 29th; the 2nd IJA would advance along the Sha river and coordinate with the 4th IJA. The 1st IJA began their advance on the 26th followed by the Guards division 3 days prior. The major attack would by performed by the 2nd and half of the 12th division against the 10th corps at Anping. The other half of the 12th with the Kobi brigade would hit the Russian left. Their assault was scheduled for the night of the 25th.  The advance of the Japanese force was terrible, it was a muddy nightmare making the movement of their heavy artillery difficult. General Mishchenko cavalry were patrolling in a gap between the two Russian groups, but had pulled back into the reserve, Kuropatkin planned to use them as a hammer later. The gap was then filled by weaker detachments. The Japanese Guards division were advancing upon the 3rd Siberians while the 10th division of the 4th IJA were hitting the gap. Kuropatkin watched this with despair believing the Guards division were actually 3 divisions strong. The Russians went into a state of frantic reinforcement. Kuropatkin ordered the 17th corps to maintain their position while also detaching the 35th division from the 17th corps to give to Ivanov’s 3rd Siberians without telling Bildering. To further assist the 3rd siberians, the 10th corps were ordered to attack eastward on the 26th thus protecting the 3rd right flank. Reserves were tossed to the southwards just before the Russians were attacked. General Liubavin on the 25th reported he believed the Japanese would cross the Taitzu and this caught the attention of both Kuropatkin and Bildering to make sure the gaps there would be filled up. Thus the 10th corps were now exposed to the combined attacks of the 2nd and 12th IJA divisions. On the 25th, the Guards Division surged into the 3rd Siberians outposts. During the night, it seemed inevitable the Japanese were exerting pressure so the 10th corps offensive actions were canceled. At 6:10am Japanese artillery was beginning to support the Guards division, hitting the 3rd Siberians position which sat on a ridge rising some 1000 feet above the river valley. The Russian artillery dueled from better firing positions until 4pm removing the Japanese artillery threat from the sector. Until 8pm the Russian artillery battered the Japanese unchallenged. The Guards division were thus severely hamstrung by the Russian artillery, but they continued without artillery support and threatened to break through into a gap between the two army groups. Meanwhile Colonel Martinov of the Zaraisk regiment, 35th division alongside a cavalry squadron and battery began to hear gunfire 5 miles in front of their position. Martinov was ordered forward more and ran into the Russian right line held by General Grekov along with multiple cavalry squadrons. Grekov reported the situation to Martinov and that he planned to toss a counter attack. The cavalry squadrons were not forthcoming for such an action, so Martinov aided him by moving unseen up a valley to hit the left flank of the advancing Japanese line. Three batteries began firing into the Japanese flank with such a devastating effect, General Asada had to order his brigade to withdraw. The attacker had become the attacked! The commander of the Guards division upon seeing the 3rd Siberian corps entrenchments, requested reserves be brought up. At 8am word was sent to Kuroki who promised him the entire army reserve, unfortunately said reserves were marching from Fenghuangcheng and were exhausted by the time they reached the guards at 6pm. In order to save Asada’s brigade, his divisional commander ordered a 3 battalion strong attack against the center of the 3rd siberian corps. The attack was intended to be a diversion, nothing serious. By 4pm the Japanese artillery were snuffed out, their infantry failed to make any progress and thus they pulled back conveniently under the cover of a storm.  Now 4 miles north east of Anping is a saddle known as Hungshaling, it elevates around 1900 feet and dominates the Tang valley. The Tambov regiment of the 9th division were atop it. Their divisional commander placed 9 battalions along the front line each one responsible for about a mile of the line, within his reserve were 7 battalions. They had two field batteries and four mountain guns in the position. The 9th division were about to be hit by Kurokis 2nd IJA main central thrust, supported by the 12th division’s 12th brigade. The 23rd brigade of General Kigoshi were given the task of seizing Hangshaling. Now Hungshaling is a formidle steep and rocky ridge, its northern edge covers the Taitzu river while its southern overlooks the Tang river flowing through the Hungsha pass. The lower slopes are covered in trees, but then it becomes 40 yards of open steep ground. The Tambov regiment positioned their 6 field guns on a narrow 20 yard wide ridge for the best visibility possible, but this also made them vulnerable. Kurkoki’s men had little chance of taking such a position, anyone who approached would be met with blankets of shrapnel and bullets. The ridge did have one weak spot, in front of it was a carpet of dead ground which could not be properly covered by the defenders, and attackers could get their artillery there to hit them.  The 2nd and 12th IJA divisions attacked the 10th corps position on the night of the 25th. The 2nd division advanced in two columns attacking the right hand side of the 10th corps. By 8am the attack was petering out without progress. The 12th division advanced in five columns and managed to penetrate the Russian line and this led Russian units to pull back, exposing the left flank and Hungshaling. At 8:30pm on the 25th, the 23rd IJA brigade began their approach upon Hungshaling. Just after 1am, two battalions joined up taking a nearby spur called Suribachi Yama, while another regiment to their northwest position two mountain guns on the North Papanling. The Japanese were quite exposed and in isolated pockets, they prodded around, but were repelled everytime from the defenders upon their heights. At dawn the fighting really began. The Japanese artillery located at a place called One Tree Pass moved forward under fire from the Tambov regiment. The Tambov commander sent three companies to counter attack as the Japanese were motioned for a toehold upon the hill. For two hours the battle raged back and forth. The Russians then received word the 9th division on their right had withdrawn. At this point their reserve was down to half, while the Japanese had depleted theres. The Russians began the age old tactic of tossing boulders down the hill upon the advancing Japanese to great effect. By midday both sides were exhausted and bloody.  General Sluchevski of the 10th corp watched Hungshalings struggle nervously. He continuously requested reinforcements from Bildering, but Bildering believed he was overreacting and refused to release the 3rd division. Bouldering was withholding the 3rd division because he sought to use them in the emergency that the Japanese managed to cross the Taitzu, he was also being fed information from Ivanov that he was facing far more units than he actually was. At 3:30pm the Japanese artillery began to fire again, fiercely targeting Hungshaling. The Japanese attacked from the south, but to no avail. A concurrent attack from the north in regimental strength was more successful. The Japanese swept past some abandoned batteries causing nearly 50% casualties upon their occupants before they pulled out. The Tambov regiment clung to the southern portion of the ridge, but their CO was wounded and 500 out of their 2500 men were dead or too wounded to fight. By 6pm the regiment was withdrawing through Peikou under the cover of a storm.  It was a terrible loss, because the 3rd Siberians were crushing the 12th IJA division and the loss of Hungshaling would completely negate it. While Tambov’s regiment were pulling out, Sluchevski sent the last regiment of his corps reserve to Peikou while pleading with Bildering for aid. At 8pm Bildering agreed to send two regiment to the 10th corps, but it was all too late. Kuropatkin received word of the fall of the Peikou sector and ordered it recaptured immediately, for it threatened the entire outer defensive line. All the while the storm raged and with so much rain, reports came that the Tang river was rising and that her bridges might be lost, leaving the only viable crossing point for the 10th corps at a bridge 3 miles north of Anping which was now dominated by the Japanese position at Peikou. The 10th corps were withdrawing and this in turn threatened the position of the 3rd Siberians. That night Kuropatkin ordered the whole army to withdraw to the advanced position. The situation of the Southern group was nowhere near as desperate as the Eastern Group. Zarubaiev was ordered to resist but also to withdraw once the enemy began its main attack. The 26th had been a rather quiet day, then on the 27th at 6am the Southern group began their withdrawal. The Eastern group conducted a difficult and rather dangerous withdrawal through the rained out roads, but made it to their advanced positions without conflict. The energy was sapped out of the men, General Stakelberg commanding the 1st Siberians asked Zarubaeiv if his troops could rest on the 28th and Zarubaeiv agreed. For some reason General Zasulich’s 2nd siberians did not comply like the rest and continued to retreat and this move exposed the left flank of the stationary 4th Siberians holding a central position. The 4th Siberians could not retreat because the road heading north was blocked. The 3rd and 5th IJA divisions advanced too quickly, Zarubaeiv ordered Zasulich to stop his withdrawal, but he did not comply. Zarubaeiv sent the order again, and yet Zasulich did not comply. Kuropatkin then ordered Zasulich to turn back and help cover the withdrawal of the corps that he had effectively abandoned stating “if it were necessary to do so to cover the retreat of those Corps, to fight to the last man and perish’. Gradually the Russians got into their advanced lines, but it was a terribly messy ordeal. Countless supplies were abandoned, an entire battery was left on a road. Teams of men trying to grab materials were being fired upon by the Japanese who did not let up.  Thus the first round of defenses was defeated. It was a confused mess. The 3rd Siberians and 10th corps received a blow to morale. With the contraction of forces to the secondary advanced line, Kuropatkin now placed his 17th corp on the north bank of the river. The second line of defenses was around 7 miles south of Liaoyang and included numerous hills that were heavily fortified. The Russians line contracted afford more defense, but this also allowed Oyama to encircle them easier. As darkness fell on August 29th, Oyama issued his orders to attack and took the 2nd IJA’s 4th division under his personal command. The 2nd IJA would advance upon the Soushanpu position to Hsinlitun overlooking the Tassu brook. To their right was the 4th IJA who would attack the area from Hsinlitun to Tsaofantun. The Guards division with other elements would attack the line of hills running north east. The 12th division with support from the 15th brigade and the 2nd divisions artillery would cross the Taitzu river to try and turn the Russian left flank. Thus three Japanese divisions would be attacking the 1st Siberian corp west of the Tassu brook; to the east of the Tassu brook the 10th division, 10th brigade, guards division and 3rd brigade would attack the 3rd Siberian corps and 10th corps. Assuming the units got over the Taitzu the 2nd and 12th divisions would hit the 17th corps. Kuropatkin outnumbered the Japanese significantly in the east, not so much in the west. Oyama kept his 4th division in his own hands to meet any possible Russian counter moves. Dawn on the 30th, the attack began. There was little progress to be made as the Russian artillery battered the attackers back. The casualties were immense for some units, the 2nd regiment only got within 1000 yard of the Russian lines and suffered 71 deaths and 325 wounded for the day. The second guards brigade supported by a kobi battalion attacked a 1030 feet hill held by the 11th east siberian regiment and 36th regiment. The Japanese managed to seize forward trenches, but soon Russian batteries came in and dislodged them. At 5am the 10th IJA division with 2 kobi regiment attacked some heights south and west of Tsaofantun held by the 3rd corps. The fighting was vicious and the Russians charged out of their trenches to meet the Japanese bayonet to bayonet. British Captain James Jardine attached with the 2nd IJA wrote this of the action “Whenever one side charged, the other side always charged to meet them. To a listener the effect was extraordinary. A hot musketry fight might be in progress, when suddenly the Russians would sound the charge. Instantly all firing would cease on either side, the Japanese cheering wildly in answer to the drums and bugles of the enemy. The Russians cheer ‘Hoorah!’, the Japanese, on such desperate occasions, cheer ‘Wa-a-a!’ The impression given by these cheers, mingling with the rattle of the drums and the clangour of the bugles, was more melancholy than martial, sounding like a prolonged wail of grief ascending from the troubled earth up into the dark heavens. “ The 3rd battalion of the 23rd east Siberian regiment bore the brunt of the attack and within 20 minutes lost all of their officers and 304 out of 502 soldiers. A russian battery rushed over and at a range of 600 yards battered the Japanese tossing them back.  Oyama’s strategy at this point was to unhinge the Tassu brook position so the 4th IJA could turn the flank of the 1st and 3rd corps. The Japanese were gradually pushing forward getting their artillery in range to do more effective damage. Ultimately the Japanese were halted, but Kuropatkin was nervous the Japanese would succeed in turning the flank. Kuropatkin began to shuffle some units around and this allowed the Japanese to seize the village of Wuluntai and begin shelling Hill 693 and Mahyetun. The 2nd IJA advanced along the railway with the 5th division of the 4th IJA supporting them to the right. Their combined force began forcing open a gap. Stakelberg began requesting reinforcements from Kuropatkin, but Kuropatkin rejected this believing the Japanese could not be strong everywhere along the line and thus things must be already be stabilized. Stakelberg was instructed to assist the 3rd corps, but if their position and his was untenable they should withdraw to the inner defense line.  The attacks opening the gap to the Tassu brook were increasing in strength, prompting Stakelberg to plead again for reinforcements. Despite the pressure the Japanese were applying since 6am, it was not until 11am when their line was complete and ready to really assault. At 12:45pm Stakelberg yet again requests more reinforcements and this time he was granted them, but unfortunately they were coming from the hill 693 sector and were heavily delayed. Stakelberg frantically plugged gaps in his line, until 2pm when finally some reinforcements arrived. Meanwhile Mishchenko grabbed a mixed force of 15 battalions drawn from numerous corps and charged into the Japanese north of hill 693. The action was uncoordinated and basically saw the men just filling a defensive line instead of actually dislodging the Japanese attackers upon the hill. Stakelberg reported at 4:40pm he had fully stabilized his lines. The night saw numerous attacks launched against hill 693 and Mahyetun, but without success. To make a demonstration, the Japanese demoted 3 generals for their lack of success. One of those generals was the father of Hideki Tojo. One commander who had a chance at success was General Kuroki. Bold action was required so Kuroki took action at 1pm on his own initiative to order a crossing of the river stated for 11pm that night. At midnight his forces began cross the Taitzu river unopposed some 15 miles to the east of Liaoyang. The water was around 3 feet deep where they crossed. Russian dragoons watched the Japanese cross the river and establish a bridgehead, they frantically sent word to Kuropatkin which only reached him by 11am because their telephones were having problems. The Russians had lost the vital opportunity to smash the Japanese as they crossed, cavalry forces under Liubavin who were supposed to be screening, but instead withdrew leaving the infantry. The morning of the 31st saw further Japanese attacks upon all the strategic features. Hsinlitun was being enveloped slowly, hill 693’s forward trenches were overwhelmed and seized, though the Japanese artillery would tragically hit their own men in the process. The Russians and Japanese atop hill 693 ended up fighting with bayonets leading to  The 34th IJA regiment suffered 487 killed with 632 wounded, the 3rd east siberian regiment facing them took 35% officer and 38% casualties in the process. Shoushan hill saw a similar clash and a surprise attack was performed at the villages of Mahyetun and Kuchiatzu, but Russian machine guns saved them. Oyama still held back his 4th division wary of counter attacks, by nightfall the Russian line not only held, it caused 3000 casualties upon the Japanese. The saving grace was only to be Kuroki’s river crossing which gravely worried Kuropatkin who issued orders to his corps commanders “disposition No 3”. This plan was for a general retreat to the inner defensive line while reserves would be launched to hit Kuroki’s bridge head, then estimated to be 70,000 men. At 7:30pm the corps commanders initiated the command.  Kuropatkin was still under the belief the enemy was much larger than they were, he had thus handed them a victory at the second line and it was completely unwarranted. By 1am the Japanese were discovering the Russians were withdrawing and by 3am, the Japanese seized all the features they had been bleeding for. With the first light of day they could now see Liaoyang more clearly as they brought their artillery closer and closer.  At this point Oyama believed he was dealing with a routed army. The 17th Siberian army corps were now divdied. On the right was the 3rd division holding hil l1057, to the left was Lt General Dobrjinski 35th division on hill 920, the corps reserve was to the rear at the village of Shahotun led by Major General Glasko. Facing them was Kuroki. Kuroki observed the new Russian lines and saw a 75 foot knoll, it was the Russians “vital ground”. Vital ground was a terrain that if possesed by an enemy would seriously interfere with ones defense. Kuroki called the knoll Manju Yama meaning “rice cake hill”. Major General Okasaki’s 15th brigade of the 2nd division was given the mission to seize hill 920 and Manju Yama while the 12th division would advance to cut off the railway.  At 8:30am the artillery began a duel and the Japanese took care to batter Manju Yama. At 9:30am the 15th brigade with the 12th divisions artillery for support began to attack Manju Yama, they would soon be joined by the 23rd brigade. As daylight was dimming the fire fight over Manju Yama remained fierce. The knoll was heavily fortified, the Russians knew it was of utmost importance to hold it. By 10:30pm the Japanese managed to gain a toehold on the northside of the knoll. Meanwhile the battle for hill 920 resulted in the Russians gradually evacuating the position. Their evacuation led to further units of the 17th corps pulling back weakening the line. The Russians launched two counter attacks at hill 920, but both failed seeing them pull out of the area by 4am. With the loss of hill 920 also came the loss of Manju Yama. Now three Russian corps wee severely restricted in their ability to maneuver. Within the Japanese hands Manju Yama provided the element of a shield to protect further river crossings, this was a catastrophe for the Russians. Now Kuroki sought to advance the forces to sweep away Liubavins cavalry, to approach the Yentai mines and seize the junction of the Yentai mines- Mukden railway.  Meanwhile Kuropatkin was not informed of the loss of Manju Yama, Bildering only reported a hill to the northeast was captured, but that he would recapture the position when he had reorganized his reserves. When the loss of Manju Yama became known, the 1st Siberian corp was ordered to come up alongside the 17th corp and attack the Japanese right flank and rear. General Orlov commanding the 54th division of the 5th Siberian corp was ordered to cooperate with the 17th corp and recapture Manju Yama. Orlov was to take orders from Bildering and received orders at 7pm on September 1st to attack the Japanese position alongside the 17th corps at dawn. But two hours later Orlov received other orders stating  ‘Your principal task is to keep in touch with Bildering, and if he is not attacked to act in the manner which has been indicated. If however he is attacked at Hsikuantun you will move to his support by the shortest route.’ Orlov was confused by this and sent word to Bildering asking for clarification, but his messenger got lost in a field of Kaoliang. Rather than do nothing Orlov took up a position south of the Yentai mines with Samsonov waiting for orders to strike.  From his position Orlov could see the fighting on Manju Yama, it seemed the 17th corps were in deep battle, so Orlov acted. He left Samsonovs cavalry, two battalions and 8 guns to defend the Yentai mines as he rushed forward. Orlovs force became disorganized in some kaoliang, his artillery were unable to keep up properly. Most of Orlov’s men were reservists and when they met the enemy everything fell to ruin. By 1pm it was clear to Orlov his force was in a hopeless position, his main body was losing a battle of atrition and his left flank was about to be turned. Amidst the slaughter a messenger showed up at 1:10pm telling Orlov the 17th corps were falling apart and to act with extreme caution. Orlov replied  ‘As I am unable to effect a junction with either the First Siberian or Seventeenth Corps, I am falling back on Yentai Station.’ The Japanese chased their terrified fleeing oponents in a tremendous rout. Stakelbergs battered 1st siberian corps were advancing in two columns when they came across Orlov’s rabble fleeing westward. Stakelberg in a very sick state ordered Orlov to grab his one remaining battalion and head back into the kaoliang forest to hit the Japanese artillery. Orlov personally led the battalion into the fray of battle and was hit 5 times in the head and stomach, his battalion was destroyed, what would remain of them would limp back to the Yentai mines. The Japanese set up artillery on the Shoushan Hill and began firing upon the western defenses of Liaoyang, as told to us by a correspondant of the times “The civilised world had never seen anything to compare with the final preparations for the advance of the Japanese infantry. The massed and scattered batteries took the line of Russian resistance in sections. The 250 guns opened first on the Russian settlement. Great columns of dust and smoke rose up from amidst the grey stone buildings. Then suddenly out of this whirlwind of bursting shell shot up great tongues of lurid flame. The very rocks of Shoushan quivered with the blasts of ever recurrent discharges. The air shrieked with the rush of high velocity projectiles.”  The railway station was evacuating the wounded and civilians, it became a primary target for the Japanese artillery. Shells burst over the post office, the Red Cross tents, over a hospital, over numerous homes and business, it was chaos. Despite the breakthrough where Orlov was wounded, many Russian positions were holding. Kuropatkin left Liaoyang at 6am for the eastern side of the battlefield. He recieved signals from multiple commanders that Manju Yama was captured, but Bildering contuined to send word he was about to regain the feature. Kuropatkin ordered Zarubaeiv to perform a offensive to buy time, the offensive would costs 1200 Russian casualties. In the meantime General Dobrjinski’s 35th division were ordered to recapture Manju Yama. Dobrjinski’s men advanced through the Kaoliang forest, but Bildering contuined to issue reports he was “just about to attack the feature” prompting Kuropatkin to continously postpone Dobrjinski’s attack until it was nighttime and when they attacked they received no supprt and were defeated with heavy losses. On September 2nd during the afternoon Kuropatkin received news of Orlov’s deafeat, the 12th IJA had lost 180 men, Orlov had lost 1450, absolutely crushing.  Numerous Russian units coverged against Manju Yama; 7 battalions from the 1st European and 5th Siberian corps attacked it from the right; General Vasiliev held 13 battalions of the 10th corps in the center and on the left were 6 battalions of the 17th corps under Colonel Istomin. Atop Manju Yama was the 15th brigade with one other regiment already battered. At 2:15pm 152 guns began firing upon the feature until 7pm. The Russian infantry began at 7pm when darkness fell. The Russians quickly became disoriented in the Kaoliang field, friendly fire occurred everywhere. Many of the Russians would not even make it within 20 yards to hurl grenades at the Japanese trenches. By 8:30 the Russians had to pull back. Later that night magnesium flares were launched and a fierce assault was made. By 9pm the attack became chaotic, to many troops of both armies were intermingled. The Russian national anthem literally had to be played to get their troops to assembly positions again. At 11pm the Russians were being pushed away, while Bildering continued to report to Kuropatkin “at any moment the pivot will be back in our hands”. In reality the Russian attack was definitely beaten back. 3 Russian regimental commanders and 300 troops were dead. On September the 5th when Japanese burial teams completed their work they would find 1039 casualties stood atop Manju Yama. At 3am on september 3rd, Zarubaeiv reported to Kuropatkin he was running low on ammunition and being beaten back. Then Stakelberg reported “I report that my situation is serious, and that, in consequence of the severe losses suffered by my regiments during the last five days, I not only cannot without serious reinforcements assume the offensive, but cannot even accept battle. I have therefore resolved to retreat this night on Liulinkou, where I will await fresh orders. ‘ After this were reported of Orlov’s defeat and that Liubavins cavalry screen was 20 miles from Mukden. Then Bildering reported that the Russians were forced off Manju Yama and that he would most likely have to withdraw and would not be able to continue offensive actions. At 4am another message came from Bildering ‘Very unfortunate. But since Stakelberg also has retreated, I must decide to retreat on Mukden and beyond. Concentrate there, reorganise and advance.’ Kuropatkin replied ‘My communications with Mukden being threatened by considerable Japanese forces, I am retiring my army to that place, as its first duty is to protect those communications.’ And thus a 43 miles retreat to Mukden would begin on September 3rd and end by the 10th. The Japanese lost 5337 men dead and 18063 wounded. For the Russians it was 3611 dead and 14,301 wounded. It was in essence an indecisive battle, a army of 200,000 Russians would slip away to fight another day. The Official British History summed up the battle of Liaoyang as such “The importance of this battle can hardly be exaggerated. By their victory the Japanese triumphantly vindicated their strategy and extricated themselves from a position which at one time threatened to prove extremely dangerous. Moreover, the knowledge that they had emerged victorious from a bitter trial of strength gave them that supreme confidence in their own invincibility which is the greatest asset of a soldier. Lastly, a reverse following, as it would have upon the failure of the first general assault upon Port Arthur, must have been disastrous for Japan. It is not, therefore, without reason that the twelve days from 23 August to 3 September have been called the most crucial period in the history of the War. “ Tsar Nicholas II sent Kuropatkin a conciliatory message following the news of the retreat from Liaoyang: ‘From your reports of the fighting at Liaoyang I appreciate that it was impossible for you to have held that position longer without risk of being completely cut off from your communications.’ By september 6th, the Tsar ordered a second Manchurian army to be formed and both armies would henceforth be led by Alexeiev. The battle of Liaoyang held up 50,000 Russians at Port Arthur from helping and nearly 100,000 Japanese likewise. Now the road was wide open for the Japanese to conquer the rest of Manchuria.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kuropatkin was fed terrible intelligence and believed he was facing a much larger enemy than he was. In the end Kuropatkin fought a valiant battle for Liaoyang and inflicted tremendous casualties upon the Japanese, but Oyama’s strategy won the day.