3.77 Fall and Rise of China: Russo-Japanese War #4: Telissu

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanshan. After their loss at the battle of Yalu, the Russians began a withdrawal while trying to delay the Japanese advance upon Port Arthur. The 2nd IJA of General Oku landed at Pitzuwo along the Liaodong peninsula. To open the path to Port Arthur and cut her off from reinforcements from the rest of Manchuria. General Oku first had the 4th IJA division seize Chinchou before bombarding Nanshan both from land and sea. The Russian defenders led by Colonel Tretyakov fought like lions exacting a terrible price upon the Japanese, but ultimately it was the foolish General Fok who made a blunder of things resulting in a chaotic withdrawal. Nanshan was seized and General Nogi with the 3rd IJA began to land at Takushan ready to pounce on the prize of Dalny. Dalny was seized without a fight and now Nogi’s men prepared to besiege Port Arthur.    #77 The Russo-Japanese War part 4: The Russian counter offensive at Telissu   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we have seen with the battles of Yalu and Nanshan, the Russians seemed to have an enormous strategic problem. The core of the problem was the fact that the Tsar appointed General Kuropatkin to lead the war, but left the real power in the hands of Admiral Alexeiev. There were clear philosophical differences between the two men, hell one was an admiral trying to lead land battles. Kuropatkin understood logistics better, he knew they needed to bide time so more men could travel abroad the trans Siberian over to the far east so a proper offensive could be made. But Alexeiev and his financial friends in the Royal Timber company feared losing their investments in Manchuria. As I mentioned in an earlier episode Alexeiev’s position and appointment of Viceroyalty was actually the brainchild of Aleksandr Bezobrazov who recommended it to the Tsar. In many ways the Russo-Japanese war was fought for the financial benefit of some elites in Russia and this would help stoke revolutionary fever back home. Kuropatkin was not 100% sure of the Japanese disposition and intentions. The 1st IJA beat them at the Yalu and seemed to be heading northwest towards Liaoyang. The 2nd IJA landed at Pitzuwo, defeated them at Nanshan and now held Dalny. The 10th division, the nucleus of the soon to be created 4th IJA had landed at Takushan while the 3rd IJA seemed to still be in Japan. Kuropatkin wrote in his memoirs “it was incumbent on us, therefore to exercise great caution and to keep our forces as far as possible concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three armies”. The slow pass of the trans Siberian railway to reinforce him by May was causing Kuropatkin to seriously consider withdrawing from Liaoyang to Harbin. But the Tsar and court demanded he go on the offensive to try and rescue Port Arthur. Alexeiev’s chief of staff Jalinski sent to Kuropatkin basically two options. Number 1, contain the 2nd IJA and attack the 1st IJA and 4th IJA in the direction of Yalu. Number 2 perform an offensive against the 2nd IJA to the north of Port Arthur while blocking the 1st IJA. Neither option was good, but Kuropatkin chose the 2nd one. Kuropatkin believed an attack from the direction of Liaoyang would leave the Russian right flank and rear exposed to a possible landing of the 3rd IJA. Kuropatkins staff believed such a landing might occur at Yingkou. Having to allocate troops to protect his right flank and rear, Kuropatkin only had 60-70 of his 94 battalions in mid may. The railway did not run towards Yalu, therefore his logistical lines would be terrible, feeding such an immense army was not easy.  On the other side, General Nogi who had commanded the 1st IJA brigade that took Port Arthur in 1894 was given initially the 1st and 11th divisions for the same task in 1904. It soon became very apparent he required at minimum 4 divisions for the job. His force began a siege against Port Arthur and this in turn affected Kuropatkin’s situation. Port Arthur had been provisioned to sustain 12 battalions for 12 months. But now it held 27 battalions and an enormous amount of refugees from places like Dalny, it was theorized to only be able to hold out for 6 months. On May 23rd Jalinski arrived to Kuropatkins HQ at Liaoyang whereupon he gave him the two options. Kuropatkin thought both options were idiotic and screamed at Jalinski, unwilling to comply. Alexeiev proposed sending the case to the Tsar for adjudication, thus both Kuropatkin and Alexeiev sent reports to the Tsar. Alexeievs case report drew attention to losing the navy and Port Arthur would lose the war based on a loss of morale. Kuropatkin explained going on an offensive southwards would simply expose his army to a devastating attack and it was better to hold up at Liaoyang and build up strength. He also advised that Port Arthur held no tactical significance anymore. The Tsar convened a council of war and they all agreed if Port Arthur fell the incoming baltic fleet would have nowhere to turn to. Thus Kuropatkin was instructed to rescue Port Arthur. In June of 1904, General Kuroki’s 1st IJA was due north of Yalu heading for Liaoyang. To confront them was Lt General Keller and Major General Rennenkampf, yes that crazy badass from the last war. They had roughly 23,000 infantry, 3600 cavalry and over 90 guns of various caliber. General Oku’s 2nd IJA meanwhile were going to be confronted by the 1st Siberian corps of Lt General Stakelberg who had 30,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry and over 100 guns. Within the 2nd IJA’s center was Geneal Nozu’s 10th IJA division who would be confronted by Major General Mishchenko’s Cossack brigade. To the rear at Liaoyang and Mukden was General Kuropatkin with his growing force of 36,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry and 120 guns. The European 21st division had just arrived, and the 10th army corps + two cavalry divisions were en route. As you can see, the Russians were being forced to separate their forces by the Japanese. If they consolidated the Russians would be a force to be reckoned with. The Russians strategic lifeline, their greatest advantage was the railway, any threat to it would crush the Russian war effort. This was something that deeply troubled Kuropatkin at all times, he would have 55,000 men deployed just to defend the line between the Ural Mountains and the Manchurian frontier. Within Manchuria a force of 25,000 men were assigned to protect the lines there. Meanwhile every strategic point such as railway bridges were being attacked by Honghuzi forces under the direct guidance of Japanese officers. The Qing officially told the Russians they were doing everything they could to thwart the Honghuzi menace, but in reality they were doing pretty much nothing at all. In a single month over 90 major attempts to disrupt the railway would occur between Mukden and Tiehling. On June 7th, Kuropatkin visited Stakelberg at his HQ to give him verbal orders to accompany the written ones he received “Your Excellency’s Army Corps is detailed with the object of drawing upon itself the greatest possible number of the enemy’s forces and thereby weakening his army operating in the Kwantung Peninsula. Your advance, therefore, against the enemy’s covering troops must be rapid and energetic, in the hope of crushing his advanced detachments should they prove to be weak in numbers. In the event of your encountering superior strength decisive action will be avoided and in no case will you allow the whole of your reserves to become engaged until the conditions are entirely clear. The object of our southerly movement is the capture of the Chinchou (Nanshan) position, and thereafter an advance on Port Arthur.” By late May, General Oku began to hear rumors the Russians were performing an advance so he dispatched the 1st Cavalry Brigade of Major General Akiyama to investigate the area of Telissu. The Japanese war plan at this moment was to gradually bring 3 of their armies together to confront the Manchurian army. The first target would be Liaoyang, but to advance to Liaoyang there were some large mountain ranges in the way. These were the Hsiungyaoshan and Fenshuling. The 1st and 4th IJA would have to pass through the passes of each mountain, those being the Motien and Fenshui passes. The Russians had fortified positions in both passes. Meanwhile, Akiyama’s cavalry reached Telissu on May 30th and ran into a Russian cavalry brigade led by General Samsonov. This began a small scale battle where both sides were attacking another while simultaneously trying to reinforce their position. The 2nd squadron of the 13th IJA cavalry regiment were charged upon their left flank by two squadrons of the 8th Siberian cossacks to shocking effect. The Japanese would note the Cossacks used their lances to excellent effect. Casualties were not heavy, but the Japanese understood in the realm of cavalry they were simply outmatched. Thus the Japanese cavalry soon took up a position on along the mountains where they could dismount and fight like dragoons.  On June 3rd General Akiyama reported back to Oku that elements of the 1st Siberian army corps were entering Telissu. Oku ordered Akiyama to pull out swiftly. On the 5th, Stakelberg arrived to Telissu as the main body of the 1st Siberian corps were getting off trains. Stakelberg ordered Samsonov to take his cavalry and fortify a position 5 miles to the south. Basically Stakelberg was leapfrogging towards Port Arthur, using the railway as a general path of advance. On the 6th Oku received a report of the cavalry advance and now the Japanese were beginning to see the Russians were trying to rescue Port Arthur. IJA general HQ sent orders to ramp up activity to weaken Stakelberg’s advance. Until this point the 1st and 4th IJA had been generally performing an offensive, however the 1st IJA were not exactly in a position to do so. The 10th division were still unloading at Takushan, to compensate General Kuroki was given a Guards brigade and ordered to seize Hsiuyen. Kuroki attacked Hsiuyen easily dislodging a force led by Mishchenko there by June 8th. Now back at Telissu, Stakelberg received reports on June 13th that over 20,000 Japanese were advancing north from Pulantien. He believed this to be an exaggeration so he sent three Cossack squadrons to investigate. On the same day, Oku’s supplies had finally arrived and his 2nd IJA were able to begin their advance towards Liaoyang. The Cossacks saw the movement and came back to report it to Stakelberg who quickly abandoned his offensive to instead await the enemy at their prepared defensive positions south of Telissu. By the early morning of the 14th, the Japanese were 14 miles away from the forward Russian trenches. If you pull out a map of Telissu, there is a river, the Fuchou that heads in its direction. South and parallel to this is the railway going directly through Wafangtien then through Telissu. General Stakelberg deployed his troops astride the railway. To the west of the railway were the under strengthened 9th East Siberian rifle division, 5 battalions and two batteries. East of the railway was the bulk of his forces; the 1st East siberian rifle division of 12 battalions and 4 batteries. Lt General Simonov arrived to the scene to take command of the 19 cavalry squadrons previously under Samsonov, his position would be right of the Russian line. Two regiment of the 9th east siberian division and a regiment of the 3rd siberian infantry division were enroute by rail. The Japanese as usual enjoyed exact details on the Russian order of battle via their spy network. Oku had his 3rd and 5th divisions perform a frontal attack with the railway being a divisional boundary line. His 4th division was to perform a sweep going around the Fuchou valley from the west to hit the Russians right flank. So if you were looking at this on a map basically the east had a Russian division with 4 batteries facing a Japanese division with a cavalry brigade and in the west the Russians had a brigade with two batteries, 19 cavalry squadrons to face against two full Japanese divisions.  The Russians defenses were lines of trenches running for 8.5 miles. The shelter trenches were 9 inches deep with 15 inches of parapet. Riflement would be crouched shoulder to shoulder with no overhead cover. Below the Russians the valley afforded the attacker decent covered approaches, thus poor fields of fire for the defender. To the south there were some hills that provided a screen the Japanese could use to conceal their movements. As was the case with most of the battles in this war, it was to be won and lost by artillery. The Russian senior artillery officers insisted their guns could only be effective firing upon stationary targets from covered positions. The junior officers thought this was folly, but were obliged to do as they were told. The brand new Russian quick firing gun would appear for the first time in this battle, but would not be used effectively. The major problem was that of training. The Russian artillery crews had only had these guns for 4 months and as one military observer noted ‘in many, if not in most, cases, had not carried out any practice with them; the supply of ammunition was no doubt a factor’. The men simply did not really understand the enormous capability the new weapon held, because if used effectively the Japanese really had no way to counter it. On the morning of the 14th, the 3 Japanese divisions advanced. The 3rd and 5th kept in visual contact along the railway as the 4th moved further northwest to perform their hook attack. The 6th division was just beginning to land and Oku ordered them to immediately come over to build up his reserve, by the day of the battle, two battalions would make up that reserve. The advance of the Japanese had been quite fast taking the Russians off guard. The Russians were unable to lay out their telephone lines in time and would be at the mercy of runners. The Russian screening forces were gradually brushed aside until at 2pm the Japanese ran into Russian artillery fire in the center. The Japanese artillery of the 3rd division responded trying to tease out the Russian artillery positions. By 3pm a fuel artillery duel was raging. Oku’s scouts re-estimated the Russians to be 3 divisions strong. Oku was well aware every hour that passed was an hour more Russian reinforcements were traveling to them via the railway. On the 15th 3000 infantry and two more artillery pieces would arrive. While the artillery duel raged, probing attacks were launched by the 34th IJA regiment against the left part of the Russian line. The 1st and 2nd East Siberian regiments had to consolidate to repel the attack, but in doing so the 2nd east siberian regiment took heavy casualties. By midday the 4th IJA division arrived to the scene and took up a position on the left bank of the Fuchou river. Their commander General Baron Ogawa read his orders at 5am on June 15th from Oku “As no danger is to be anticipated from the direction of the valley of the Fuchou river, you will detach a force of at least one brigade of infantry which will attack the enemy’s right flank and help the advance of the other divisions.” Ogawa ordered his men to clear the town of Fuchou, the Russians would have been able to see this action using heliographs, but there was a large fog concealing them. Now Stakelberg did not like his subordinate Samsonov, he had very little confidence in the mans ability and that of his Cossack cavalry. In fact when a British military observer was walking touring the defensive lines with Stakelberg he pointed out how vulnerable his right flank looked. Stakelberg remarked ‘I have a (cavalry) squadron or so near Fuchou, but, if three Japanese squadrons advance, mine will retire without finding out the Japanese strength.’ During the night of the 14th, said cavalry had actually discovered the Japanese advance upon their right flank and sent word of this to Stakelbergs chief of staff. The exact same British military observer happened to be present in the HQ and recalled “the chief of staff was told it was a report from Samsonov. It spoke of the Japanese advancing against their right flank. I thought to myself“that his chief had mentioned the possibility to me and would be glad to hear the news. My companion replied that Samsonov’s cavalry were completely useless and that he did not intend to worry Stakelberg about the message”. At 3:30pm, Oku established his new HQ at Wafangtian. By 11pm he ordered his two divisions on the left to perform an attack on the Russian left and center up to the line of the railway set for dawn on the 15th. While the Russians would be concentrating upon their left, the 5th division supported by elements of the 4th would turn their right flank. Stakelberg seeing the pressure on his left, ordered the commander of the reserves, Major General Flasko to move from the center to the left. Glasko arrived at 6pm and placed himself under the command of Major General Gerngross who was commanding the 1st division. Thus three quarters of the Russian strength was now focused in the east, no reserves were available to support the west until the anticipated reinforcements arrived by rail that very night. Both Oku and Stakelberg were seeking to perform counterstrokes at dawn on the 15th. A counterstroke is not a counter attack by the way, it differs as it is aimed generally at the destruction of enemy forces rather than the seizure of territory. Thus you seek to block the enemy advance with a strong defensive line and then hit the enemy flank with a hammer to cause as many casualties as possible. Counter strokes are quite difficult to pull off, they heavily depend on opportunism and quite honestly the boldness of commanders. Frequently in history you see counter strokes occur just when some fresh reinforcements arrive to the scene of battle. Now its not like General Stakelberg issued some operation order for a counter stroke, what he did was sent various commanders separate memoranda. Thus one commander did not know what the other was to do. The memoranda stated that the operation would begin between 1 and 2 am on the 15th, but in an event before daybreak. The exact timing was left to the mutual agreement of commanders like Glasko and Gerngross who were commanding over 16 battalions, half the infantry on the Russian side. The orders were passed down through the night. Men savored their rolled cigarettes, those in the front trenches ate a black bread around dusk. The Russians in the forward positions could hear the Japanese preparing themselves, everyone was anxious. At 2am some shots were fired from nervous Russian positions, starting a fusillade along the entire line. The Japanese advanced during the night closer to the Russian lines as Russian officers barked at their men to restore order. No one got any sleep that night. At 4am the battlefield had a large mist hit. General Gerngross decided his counter stroke would begin at 4am, he sent word to Stakelberg of his decision and awaited his commanders approval. So to reiterate…Gerngross sent word of his decision, its not like he asked “do you approve?”, he simply expected Stakelberg to reply “I approve”. To complicate things further, Glasko sent a runner to Gerngross asking what his orders were, since Gerngross was his superior, but Gerngross had not received a reply from Stakelberg. Stakelberg, probably a bit confused, did not want to intervene in his subordinates operation, the man probably assumed as any of us would that Gerngross was going through with what he said. It was then 6:40am, nothing had been done. Glasko spoke with his staff and they decided they had to take matters into their own hands, they would start an attack. It was at that moment orders arrived from Gerngross confirming the attack and that he promised support. As the troops set off suddenly another runner showed up with new orders for Glasko from Stakelberg reading “If the Japanese advance with superior force against our centre or in any other direction, the Corps will fall back slowly to Wauchialing. In this case, Major General Glasko will hold the line Kouchiatun–Tsuichiatun as long as possible, in order to give the troops falling back by Telissu time to traverse the defile north of Tsuichiatun. Should the Japanese retire, the troops will halt, and await further order.”  Needless to say, its never a great thing when a commander is about to begin an attack and his superior is advising easing on the gas pedal and potentially withdrawing. The situation became confused very quickly. Glasko frantically called back his troops and ordered them to occupy the Kouchiatun-Tsuichitun line. Meanwhile Gerngross completely unaware of any changes in orders ordered his men to attack at 7am expected and depending on Glasko’s men for support. Gerngross’s 3 infantry regiments advance over a 1500 yard front in three echelons. This resulted in only a third of his force being able to fire at any one time. The 3rd IJA division within their trenches were surprised by the attack. Now General Glasko received orders yet again to go forward, but the Russian artillery was petering out and the Japanese were growing stronger.  General Ueda leading the 5th IJA division heard news of the Russian attacks and determined to take matters into his own hands. He had his artillery cross the river at 7am and began smashing Simonov’s cavalry. Simonov believing he was only to perform delaying actions, pulled back northwest, thereby exposing the right flank of the Russian infantry lines. As the 5th division were battering the Russian forces, the 4th division arrived to the scene to add their weight against the thinly held Russian position. Soon the Russian right flank was being overwhelmed. At 11am Stakelberg received a distressing message that had originated back at 6am from his so called useless cavalry. It stated a strong force of Japanese were advancing southwest of Telissu. At that moment Stakelberg had a reserve of two battalions and another two battalions detraining at Telissu station. In a courageous manner, Stakelberg gathered the four battalions and personally launched an attack against the forward elements attacking his right flank. As brave as he was, he was too late to stop the inevitable. Stakelberg had two horses shot from under him before he issued orders to retreat at 11:30am.  West of the railway line, the Russian artillery was improving and the infantry lines were holding firm. The fighting became so fierce in the west, the lines converged and the men began to run out of ammunition and reportedly began tossing rocks at each other. General Oku was forced to toss half his reserve to assist the western front. Meanwhile Glasko’s advance had been delayed because his artillery crews were having trouble with the terrain. Glasko had given them orders to advance against the Japanese right flank to support Gerngross’s 1st east Siberian rifle division. For most of the morning, Gerngross’s attention was fixated at the developing threat west of the railway. Gradually Gerngross’s artillery became exposed and systematically annihilated. Gerngross’s right flank were then subjugated to enfilade artillery and rifle fire from the 5th IJA division causing tremendous casualties. Glasko’s forces failed to arrive to save Gerngross, thus on his own initiative by midday he ordered his division to withdraw. This order coincided with Glasko’s delayed advance which ran directly into the 1st Japanese cavalry brigade advancing to the right of the 3rd IJA division. The fierce Japanese advance was far too much for his force, so he also began withdrawing. At around 2pm General Oku received word more forces were reaching the battlefield so he finally tossed his last reserve battalion to help the 3rd division pressing home the attack. Four batteries passed through the railway gap at 2pm taking a position at Lungwangmiao which was the initial forward Russian line of defense. The artillery crews found abandoned Russian guns there. Below them heading north were four regiments of the 1st east siberian rifle division. The Japanese batteries unleashed shrapnel upon them in revenge for the hours it was tossed at them. To the east and west the Russians were contracting to the center.  Stakelberg was personally directing the withdrawal from the west, but around Telissu the bulk of his corps were being hit with artillery without mercy. The acting rearguard, the 9th east siberian rifle division, courageously held the heights west of the Telissu railway to give the men a chance at evacuating the carnage. At 2pm the whistling of a steam locomotive announced the arrival of the two remaining battalions of the 9th east siberian infantry regiment coming from Kaiping. As the men jumped off the train carts they were hit with artillery and soon the Japanese were surrounding the position, talk about entering a battlefield. The transport corps blocked the route at Panlashan and trying to exit north was impossible. The 1st east siberian division were fleeing for their lives under Japanese artillery heading east, for many days they would be hunted down, to be killed or captured. By 3pm the battle had become a catastrophe for the Russians. Like a miracle, torrential rain began. Visibility fell dramatically, Stakelberg managed to salvage what remained of his army and marched them over to Kaiping. Ultimately the battle was lost because Stakelberg was unaware of the Japanese build up against his right flank. With the loss at Telissu, the Russian attempt to relieve Port Arthur had failed. The Japanese had 217 deaths, 946 wounded, for the Russians it was 477 dead, 2240 wounded and 754 missing. Russian morale was falling apart while the Japanese felt like superhumans. When the news reached St Petersburg the government and people were becoming immune to the terrible news from the east. Things were a disaster in the east, but back home in Russia, discontent was turning into a hateful fever amongst the common people who would eventually rise up.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kuropatkin never wanted to go on the offensive and when forced to do so, everything turned to ruin. Stakelberg and his men fought bravely, but one major oversight cost them the battle at Telissu and thus Port Arthur was now on her own.