3.130 Fall and Rise of China: Long March

Last time we spoke about the Fujian Rebellion of 1933. In the midst of political turmoil, the 19th Route Army, once vital in campaigns for Chiang Kai-shek, found itself at odds with his leadership during Japan’s invasion of Shanghai in 1932. Facing internal rebellion and external threats, Chiang Kai-Shek prioritized fighting the Communists over the Japanese. The 19th Route Army, disillusioned, resisted both Japan and the CCP but ultimately faced betrayal when Chiang Kai-Shek forced them into civil conflict in Fujian, deepening divisions within China. In 1933, Chiang Kai-shek faced opposition for his appeasement of Japan, leading the 19th Route Army, frustrated by his inaction, to plot a coup. Under Chen Mingshu’s leadership, they sought alliances against Chiang Kai-Shek but struggled amid civil war pressures and Red Army conflicts. On November 20, they declared the People's Revolutionary Government in Fuzhou, aiming to unify against Japanese aggression. However, lack of support led to rapid failure; by January 1934, Chiang's forces crushed the rebellion, and its leaders fled, marking the end of the Fujian Revolution.   #130 The Long March Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. As we saw 2 episodes ago, the CCP had been taken over by the 28 Bolsheviks and Otto Braun who initiated a dramatic offensive strategy for the Red Army. Unfortunately this also came during the 5th encirclement campaign. This resulted in repeated defeats for the Red Army and the gradual shrinking of the Soviet area. In April 1934, the Central Red Army engaged in a decisive battle against the Nationalist Army in Guangchang, Jiangxi Province, suffering severe losses and now faced a critical situation. As the NRA’s grip tightened, the Red Army and the Central Committee of the CCP sought new strategies. With offensive tactics no longer feasible, the Red Army considered alternative approaches to navigate its current challenges. One overarching strategy involved co-opting the NRA by harnessing nationalistic sentiment to form a united front against the Japanese. The leadership of the Red Army hoped that by identifying a common enemy, they could temporarily alleviate the conflict with the KMT. In July 1934, they attempted to implement this strategy by deploying the Seventh Red Army Corps to western Fujian to join the 10th Red Army, commanded by Su Yu. This combined force was labeled the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Column to attract Nationalist support; however, the propaganda effort failed. The NRA subsequently obliterated the Red Army Column, resulting in the death or execution of most of its members. Approximately 800 survivors escaped and regrouped as a guerrilla unit under Su Yu, continuing to fight independently until the establishment of the Second United Front in 1937. Another breakout occurred on July 23, 1934, when the 6th Red Army Corps, operating from the Hunan-Guangdong border, traversed Hunan and joined forces with the Third Red Army, forming the Second Front Red Army, led by He Long, on October 22, 1934. It is uncertain whether either operation impacted the KMT. The escalating costs and ongoing casualties placed a heavy burden on the Red Army, complicating its ability to maintain its position. A secure new location was essential for the Red Army to reorganize, resupply, and recruit personnel. In August 1934, Bo Gu and Otto Braun secretly decided to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet. Their initial plan was to head southwest towards Hunan, seeking friendlier territory and aiming to connect with the 2nd Front Red Army. While the precise whereabouts of the 2nd Front Red Army were unclear, the leadership considered Hunan the most probable destination and devised a route to reach it. Meanwhile, the rest of the Red Army intensified its recruitment efforts, raised funds, and gathered supplies. On the night of October 10, 1934, the leadership of the Red Army issued marching orders to the 1st Front Red Army, which advanced southwest in two columns, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th Red Army Corps. The total strength of this force was about 87,000 soldiers. Many of these soldiers were unaware that it would be their final sight of the Jiangxi Soviet, as most believed they were simply executing another maneuver to outflank the KMT and strike at its rear. A contingent of 16,000 troops, including several wounded soldiers like their leader Chen Yi, remained in Ruijin to defend against and delay the KMT forces, providing the First Front Red Army with the necessary time to depart unnoticed. Thus, began what has famously been called the Long March. The first few days of the Long March were relatively calm. The Red Army steered clear of significant confrontations with the NRA forces and easily maneuvered through a gap in the encirclement. Previously, Zhou Enlai had brokered a truce with the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords involved in the Extermination campaign, allowing the Red Army safe passage through the region. Meanwhile, the Red Army troops remaining in Ruijin fiercely resisted the NRA, effectively masking the fact that the main force had already departed. Until November 8, Nationalist newspapers claimed that the Red Army was nearly annihilated. The 1st Front Red Army traveled at night, using small trails to evade detection and attacks from the air. The troop formation included the 1st and 9th Red Army Corps on the left flank, the 3rd and 8th Red Army Corps on the right, with leadership and logistical units positioned in the center, while the 5th Red Army Corps provided rear guard support. The Red Army employed porters to transport heavy equipment, such as printing presses, X-ray machines, and currency. Additional porters carried litters for the wounded and key leaders. During this period, several Red Army leaders, including Zhou Enlai, were unwell or injured, while others, like Mao Zedong, rested in litters during the day after long nights of planning. By mid-November 1934, the NRA learned that the Red Army had broken free from their encirclement and was heading westward, prompting them to pursue. Observing the Red Army's movements, Chiang Kai-shek and the NRA leadership inferred that southern Hunan was likely their destination, so they deployed troops accordingly. The Red Army advanced rapidly to the west, aiming to cross the Xiang River before the NRA could catch up. On November 27, 1934, the Red Army reached Daoxian and launched an assault on the NRA blockhouses guarding the Xiang River crossings. They quickly overran these defenses and began moving troops across the river. However, the central column of the Red Army, hindered by heavy equipment and injured soldiers, fell behind the main force. On November 28, the NRA struck the rear elements of the Red Army before they could reach the river. For 5 days, the Red Army engaged in a fierce rear guard action, trying to disengage from the NRA and successfully cross the river. By December 2, 1934, all Red Army units had successfully crossed the Xiang River, albeit at a significant cost. The Red Army lost over two divisions from the 3rd and 5th Red Army Corps, leaving just over 30,000 soldiers remaining in their ranks. Furthermore, much of the Army's heavy equipment and supplies were abandoned along the way to lighten their load. After the Red Army crossed the Xiang River, it continued to evade direct confrontations with the NRA. The challenging battle at the Xiang River had a profound impact on the Red Army, leading to a rise in desertions as soldiers recognized that the movement had turned into an exodus from Jiangxi. Many porters responsible for transporting heavy equipment also began to leave during the night, especially while navigating the difficult, muddy trails in the mountains. The Red Army made several attempts to head north to join He Long and the 2nd Front Red Army, but each time, they found their routes blocked by the NRA. As a result, they altered their plans and headed west toward Guizhou, aiming to reach Sichuan and connect with the 4th Front Red Army to establish a new Soviet. Upon arriving in Liping, Guizhou province, the Red Army leadership decided on December 18th to advance north toward Zunyi in pursuit of their goal in Sichuan. Initially, Guiyang, the provincial capital, was the intended destination, but it had been fortified with seven NRA divisions. In contrast, Zunyi appeared to be a more feasible target as the second-largest city in the province, defended only by local Guizhou forces. On January 1st, 1935, the Red Army began its march toward Zunyi, crossing the Wu River under heavy fire from Guizhou provincial troops. Within three days, they successfully crossed the river and continued toward Zunyi. On January 7, the Red Army launched an attack on Zunyi, which fell two days later. Following the capture of the city, the Red Army initiated a recruitment drive, adding 30,000 new recruits to its ranks. To enhance its mobility, they buried or abandoned much of their heavy equipment. The Red Army had originally planned to remain in the area for an extended period to refit, reorganize, and bolster their forces. The staff of the Central Cadre Unit’s Red Army Medical School seized the opportunity to conduct a week-long course on basic first aid for soldiers. However, local conditions hindered any long-term presence. The area's primary crop was opium, useful for barter but inadequate for sustaining the Red Army. Additionally, the city's position along a river bend restricted the Red Army's escape routes in the event of an NRA attack. Given these challenges, Communist leadership convened a conference to deliberate on their military strategy. The conference held on January 15th, 1935, marked a pivotal moment in Communist history. In attendance were Politburo members, including Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu, and Bo Gu, along with Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, and Otto Braun. The primary focus of the meeting was the unsuccessful military strategy employed during the 5th Extermination Campaign. Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai opened the discussion, both acknowledging their mistakes and accepting responsibility for the failures. Mao Zedong followed with a sharp critique of the strategy's use of "short, swift thrusts" and the lack of cooperation with the Fujian 19th route NRA Army. The conference continued for three more days, during which much of the Red Army leadership criticized Bo Gu and Otto Braun's approach, aligning themselves with Mao. By the end of the meeting, key leaders of the CCP and Red Army had distanced themselves from the 28 Bolsheviks, effectively making Mao Zedong the de facto leader of the CCP, despite not being formally elected to any new position at Zunyi. A significant change was the disbanding of the triumvirate leadership of Bo Gu, Otto Braun, and Zhou Enlai. Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were assigned to lead the Red Army, which then moved towards Sichuan to connect with the 4th Front Red Army. Departing Zunyi, the Red Army comprised four army corps: the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 9th Red Army Corps, although all were considerably smaller than before. The total strength of the 1st Front Red Army was approximately 35,000 soldiers. The army advanced north through Tongzi, gathering gold and opium to procure food and supplies for the journey. The 1st Army Corps, led by Lin Biao, took the lead in searching for a route to cross the Yangtze River. While attempting to secure a crossing near Chishui, the remainder of the Red Army engaged in a fierce battle with a Sichuan NRA force near Tucheng. The fighting escalated to such a degree that Mao Zedong ordered Lin Biao and his corps to return and assist. Ultimately, on January 29th, 1935, the Red Army lost contact with the enemy and abandoned its plan to cross the Yangtze River, instead retreating west to Zhaxi in Yunnan province to evade NRA forces. However, this provided only a temporary reprieve, as more NRA troops moved west into Sichuan, covering all potential crossing points along the Yangtze. Faced with limited options, Mao proposed an audacious plan on February 7th: the Red Army would split into separate columns and head back east into Guizhou to mislead the NRA, then reunite and proceed southwest into Yunnan to find a safer crossing point over the Yangtze. Executing this plan, the Red Army conducted a series of feints, diversionary attacks, and deception operations to confuse NRA leadership, as well as some of its own ranks. Mao Zedong aimed to create an opening for the Red Army to escape into Yunnan and cross the Yangtze in the Jinsha River area. The Red Army began moving east, achieving victories over the NRA, such as at Loushan Pass, where they captured about a division's worth of personnel and equipment. They continued eastward, seizing the city of Maotai and acquiring additional gold and opium for trade. In March 1935, Mao was appointed as the political commissar of the Red Army, with Zhu De serving as the commander-in-chief. His leadership role was further solidified when he was included in the triumvirate Military Council alongside Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang. Mao Zedong then initiated a deception operation, sending the 9th Red Army Corps north as a feint toward the Yangtze River, intending to reinforce NRA intelligence assessments. Chiang believed that these erratic movements indicated the Red Army was preparing for a decisive battle. Consequently, he relocated his NRA headquarters to Guiyang and deployed nearly all of Guizhou's NRA forces to the Yangtze area to encircle and eliminate the Red Army. This deployment inadvertently opened a north-south corridor in Guizhou, allowing the Red Army to move south towards Guiyang, which was now vulnerable due to the concentration of NRA forces along the Yangtze. Capitalizing on these fears, Mao sent additional Red Army units toward the provincial capital. In response, Chiang hurriedly redirected NRA forces from Yunnan to bolster defenses in Guiyang, thus creating yet another escape route for the Red Army. The Red Army swiftly exploited this corridor and advanced into Yunnan. They employed a similar feint tactic as used in Guiyang, deploying units from the 1st Red Army Corps to threaten Kunming. With the main Yunnan forces still occupied in Guiyang, the Yunnan government was forced to reallocate its frontier and militia troops to defend the capital, thus opening one final corridor for the Red Army to escape through a crossing at the Jinsha River. By April 1935, the Red Army had executed one of its most daring maneuvers, evading the NRA forces by making a sweeping maneuver into Yunnan. Despite this strategy, the Red Army still needed to cross the Yangtze River. One section of the river, known as the Jinsha River, flows from Tibet through Yunnan to Sichuan and offered excellent crossing points for the Red Army. On April 29th, Mao Zedong identified three crossing locations. The 1st Red Army Corps was assigned to cross in the north at Longjie, while the 3rd Red Army Corps would cross in the center at Hongmen. The Central Cadre Unit was designated to use the southern crossing point at Jiaopingdu. Meanwhile, the Fifth and Ninth Army Corps were tasked with rear guard operations and would cross at the nearest crossing point. Although the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps struggled to secure their crossing locations, the Central Cadre Unit successfully acquired seven boats, established security on both riverbanks, and commenced a ferrying operation that would last nine days. Consequently, the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps abandoned their original crossing points and moved to Jiaopingdu. The 3rd Red Army Corps crossed on May 7th, followed by the 1st Red Army Corps the next day. The 5th Red Army Corps maintained its rear guard before quickly crossing at Jiaopingdu on May 9th. Upon reaching Sichuan, the weary Red Army troops began to contemplate their next steps. After nearly nine months of travel, with minimal rest and significant losses, the Red Army's numbers had dwindled to around 25,000 soldiers, with much of their heavy equipment abandoned along their retreat route. They attempted to seize Huili but were met with fierce resistance from the 24th NRA Division. Outside the city, Red Army leaders held a conference on May 12th and resolved to continue north through Sichuan, aiming to cross the Dadu River to join forces with the 4th Front Red Army. As the Red Army advanced through the territory of the Yi minority, they faced hostility from the Yi people, who harbored animosity toward the Han and attacked straggling Red Army soldiers, stealing their weapons and clothing and leaving many to perish. Fortunately, Liu Bocheng and his vanguard unit from the 1st Red Army Corps negotiated a truce with the Yi, securing safe passage in exchange for promises of equal land rights and treatment after the war. On May 23rd, the Red Army reached Anshunchang along the Dadu River. Their initial attempts to cross by ferry were thwarted by strong NRA defenses on the opposite bank, and they only managed to secure three boats, which were insufficient for a crossing. On May 27th, Red Army leaders decided to take a calculated risk and dispatched troops northward to seize Luding Bridge. This iron-chain suspension bridge, located along a challenging trail through the mountain passes, crossed the Dadu River. In a remarkable act of bravery, the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division, 1st Red Army Corps, led by Yang Chengwu, marched nearly 100 miles in under 3 days to secure the bridge. Despite facing a defending NRA brigade on sheer cliffs, the 4 Regiment acted swiftly and captured the bridge amid constant gunfire, with only 18 of the 22 men who launched the final assault surviving. Their sacrifice allowed the Red Army to evade the main KMT force and successfully cross the Dadu River, ultimately establishing themselves in Hualingping for refitting operations. However, the challenges for the Red Army persisted even after crossing the Dadu. They were still unaware of the 4th Front Red Army's location, with one possible area being directly north behind the Jiajin Mountains. To avoid detection from NRA forces or ambushes by Tibetans, Mao opted for a central walking trail through the Jiajin Mountains rather than the more accessible eastern and western routes. For many survivors of the Long March, the leg through the Jiajin Mountains proved to be the most arduous and challenging segment. The Red Army soldiers faced hunger, cold, thirst, avalanches, and the high altitude as they attempted to traverse the snow-capped peaks with little more than the clothes on their backs. On June 12th, the first units of the Red Army arrived at Danwei, located at the northern foot of the Jiajin Mountains. By June 14th, the remaining soldiers descended from the mountains and linked up with Li Xiannian, a liaison officer from the 4th Front Red Army. Approximately 10,000 soldiers endured the harsh conditions and made it down the mountain. Thankfully, they rejoined their fellow Red Army comrades, allowing them to take a much-needed rest. On June 18, 1935, the 1st and 4th Front Red Armies finally connected at Lianghekou. The Fourth Front Red Army fared significantly better than its counterpart, having originated from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet before relocating to the Shaanxi-Sichuan border and settling in northwest Sichuan in March 1935. Their forces numbered nearly 80,000, surpassing the 1st Front Red Army. Some soldiers from the 1st Front looked on with admiration and envy at the robust condition of the 4th Front soldiers and their horses. On June 26th, the leadership of both armies convened to discuss their future movements. Mao Zedong proposed advancing north to Gansu, then heading east toward Ningxia, with the ultimate goal of reaching Mongolia to establish communication with the Soviet Union. Conversely, Zhang Guotao suggested moving west to Xinjiang, aiming to connect with the Soviet Union via the Central Asian Republics. Beneath these military discussions lay political maneuvering as both Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao sought to assert dominance over the Red Army. Ultimately, both sides maintained cordial relations and established a unified strategy and command. The Red Army was set to advance north to southern Gansu to establish a Soviet presence in the border areas. Zhang Guotao was appointed vice-chairman of the Military Council. By June 30, the 1st Front Red Army had moved into the Grasslands, with Zhang Guotao and the 4th Front Red Army following a day later. The meeting at Lianghekou did not resolve the political tensions between the factions led by Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong, and these conflicts intensified over time. While Zhang Guotao continued to advocate for a westward movement toward Xinjiang, he also sought to recruit key leaders from the 1st Front Red Army to support his cause, but to no avail. Mao Zedong remained steadfast in his commitment to the agreed plan to proceed to Gansu and took measures to prevent any subversion from Zhang Guotao’s camp. Tensions escalated during a conference at Maoergai on August 6th. The Red Army had arrived at Maoergai the previous day to rest and reorganize. According to one account, Mao Zedong held the meeting in the neighboring town of Shawo, securing the location ahead of Zhang Guotao arrival. As the sole representative from the 4th Front Red Army on the Politburo and Central Committee, Zhang Guotao intended to introduce additional representatives to enhance his influence, but they were unable to bypass security. This infuriated Zhang Guotao, highlighting the political maneuvering at play. Another account claims the meeting took place at Zhang Guotao’s 11th Red Army Division headquarters, with his loyal soldiers ensuring that Mao Zdong could not undermine him. Regardless, no agreements were reached during this meeting. A second meeting was held on August 20th at Maoergai, resulting in a negotiated settlement. The Red Army remained under the command of Zhu De but was divided into two columns. The Right Column included the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps, led by Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, respectively, and also incorporated the 13th and 3th Red Armies from the 4th Front. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Otto Braun traveled with the Right Column. The Left Column comprised the remainder of the 4th Front Army, along with the 5th and 9th Red Army Corps, and was led by Zhang Guotao and Liu Bocheng, with Zhu De accompanying them. Both columns would advance north while skirting the Grasslands, with the Left Column heading toward Aba and the Right Column toward Baxi. Once the plan was finalized, they began their movement into the Grasslands on August 23rd. In the Grasslands, the Red Army encountered conditions as challenging as those in the mountains. This region was home to a minority population, and the Tibetan locals were just as hostile as the Yi had been, attacking and killing many stragglers. Food sources were scarce, and many Red Army soldiers were unfamiliar with edible plant species. Water supplies were also limited, as most sources were stagnant and contaminated. The soldiers ended up consuming wheat kernels, which severely upset their digestive systems. The trailing units faced even greater difficulties, as the vanguard troops turned the dirt paths into muddy pits, leaving little food for foraging. The Right Column reached Baxi on August 27th, suffering heavy losses during the week-long trek; the 3rd Red Army Corps alone lost 400 soldiers. The Left Column progressed more slowly and arrived in Aba about a week later. Once they exited the Grasslands, the Red Army faced another internal struggle that threatened their retreat. On September 3rd, Zhang Guotao sent a wireless message to Mao Zedong and the Right Column, stating that his forces were stationed at Aba and that the White River, north of Aba, was impassable. Mao Zedong urged Zhang Guotao to adhere to the Maoergai decision and even offered additional troops to assist in crossing the river, which Zhang Guotao politely declined. On September 9th, Mao Zedong learned of a secret message Zhang Guotao had sent to his aide in the Right Column. Zhang Guotao wanted the Right Column to move back south through the Grasslands to reunite the two columns and convene a meeting to discuss a new strategy, indicating an intention to initiate an intraparty power struggle. Fearing that Zhang Guotao would use his superior numbers to impose his strategy on the Red Army, the 1st and 3rd Red Army Corps quietly departed Baxi and continued north to Gansu. This approximately 8,000-strong force arrived at Ejie and held an emergency conference. The Red Army reorganized its forces as the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Force to garner support from the local population. They also issued a “Resolution Concerning the Mistakes of Comrade Zhang Guotao,” reprimanding his actions without expelling him from the Communist Party. On September 14th, the Red Army continued north and captured the Lazikou Pass, defeating two of Zhang Guotao's forces as he and his 4th Front Army moved south toward Chengdu. Zhang Guotao was furious upon discovering that Mao Zdong and his loyal Red Army troops had left without notice, but he chose not to pursue them and instead redirected his troops toward Chengdu. The 4th Front Red Army achieved initial victories in October 1935 against the NRA at Baoxing and Tianquan, coming within sixty miles of the Sichuan provincial capital. In response to this threat, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched over 80 NRA regiments to defend Chengdu. The NRA launched a counteroffensive at Baizhang, inflicting heavy losses on the Fourth Front Red Army, which retreated in disarray back to Ganzi in western Sichuan province, where they would remain until they linked up with the 2nd Front Army in June 1936. As the 4th Front Army moved south toward Sichuan, the Red Army completed the final stage of its arduous journey. On September 21st, 1935, Mao Zedong and the Anti-Japanese Vanguard arrived in Hadapu, a Han city in Gansu province. The soldiers rejoiced at being among their own ethnic group and took a few days to rest. During their stay, Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Red Army learned that a Soviet force, led by Liu Zhidan, a friend of Mao Zedong, was present in northern Shaanxi, supporting the 25th and 26th Red Armies. 10 days later, the Anti-Japanese Vanguard left Hadapu and swiftly moved west to avoid the NRA’s Muslim cavalry units, aiming to connect with their allied units in Shaanxi. On October 19, 1935, Mao Zedong joined forces with the 25th and 26th Red Armies and settled near Wuqi. The remnants of the 1st Front Red Army had completed their year-long, 6,000-mile journey with approximately 4,000 soldiers. Once they reached the relative safety of Shaanxi, the Red Army reverted to its traditional strategy of political mobilization to gather resources, recruit new members, and propagate the communist revolution. On February 5th, 1936, the 1st Front Red Army moved east to carry out political mobilization efforts. Over the following two months, the Red Army defeated seven provincial divisions, capturing more than 4,000 soldiers. They also recruited 8,000 new members, raised $300,000 in revenue, and added 20 counties in Shanxi to their new Soviet. In May, the 1st Front Army advanced westward for a two-month operation, acquiring over 2,000 rifles and 400 horses, thereby expanding the Soviet's reach into Gansu and Ningxia. However, these efforts were ultimately thwarted by NRA forces, compelling the Red Army to relocate from Wuqi to Bao’an in June 1936. In October 1936, the 2nd and 4th Front Armies finally reached Bao’an, marking the completion of the Long March for the Red Army. With all three units reunited, the Red Army War College reopened in Dengjiaqiao, with Liu Bocheng eventually returning to lead it. Additionally, the Red Army military school began training in Tai’erwan. From 1934 to 1936, the Red Army evaded annihilation through a combination of courage, determination, and fortunate circumstances. Enduring harsh conditions and traversing some of China's most challenging terrain to escape the NRA and provincial forces, the Red Army demonstrated remarkable resilience. Mao Zedong skillfully navigated the political landscape within the Red Army, emerging as its supreme leader. The Communists also capitalized on the challenges facing the NRA and KMT leadership. The Red Army effectively utilized Chiang Kai-Sheks inability to exert full control over his subordinate warlords and their military units to avoid unnecessary confrontations. Upon reaching Shaanxi in late 1935, the survivors of the Long March were not only battle-hardened by their experiences but also carried valuable lessons learned from previous campaigns. In the relative security of the new Soviet, the Red Army expanded its ranks and resumed training and mobilization efforts. The Red Army had survived its greatest challenge to date and was poised to develop into the professional military force that would ultimately defeat the NRA and overthrow the KMT government. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus not only did the Red Army escape death at the hands of the NRA, but the experience of the Long March would actually contribute to the downfall of the NRA. Mao Zedong had emerged a top figure in the CCP and now would oversee it and the Red Army’s future development until the ultimate clash with Chiang Kai-Shek for the future of China.