3.124 Fall and Rise of China: Sino-Tibetan War of 1930–1932

Last time we spoke about the first Encirclement Campaign against the CCP. Amidst ongoing attacks, the communist movement thrived in rural Jiangxi, even as urban support dwindled. Li Lisan championed urban uprisings, opposing Mao Zedong's focus on rural encirclement. Failed assaults on Nanchang and Changsha highlighted their discord. The Red Army's strategy shifted after capturing Ji’an, bolstered by peasant support. As the NRA prepared an encirclement, Mao proposed luring them deep before striking. Internal strife peaked with the Futian Incident, leading to a purge that solidified Mao’s power but weakened the Red Army’s defenses. Amidst internal strife, the NRA launched attacks on the Reds but faced fierce resistance. Lu Diping's forces encircled Donggu, leading to heavy losses as artillery mistakenly struck their own troops. The Reds capitalized on local support and guerrilla tactics, inflicting significant defeats on the NRA in Longgang and Dongshao. Despite Chiang Kai-Shek's attempts to reclaim territory, the Reds successfully executed a series of ambushes and strategic retreats. By the end of the campaign, the Jiangxi Soviet expanded significantly, validating Mao's strategies and shifting public favor towards the communists.   #124 Sino-Tibetan War of 1930–1932 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For those who know their Sino history, we are drawing close to the year of 1931. This is arguably the year WW2 actually began, some of you might be confused by that statement, but I assure you mainland Chinese would argue this point very much. Once we breach that door its going to be a very long time before we can talk about the multiple other things going on in China. For example, a lot happens in China’s northwest. So I thought it would be best to tackle some of that before we jump into the 15 year China War. Do forgive me for being a tease. So the first thing I wanted to talk about is the Second Sino-Tibetan War of 1930-1932. Now this is a huge can of worms as they say and to truly understand it we need to cover a lot of history. There has always been conflict between whatever we consider historically China and Tibet. Historians have often broken things down into three major conflicts during the early 20th century that led directly to the second Sino-Tibetan War. After the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, the 13th Dalai Lama closely monitored the political changes in mainland China and the situation of the central government's officials and military stationed in Tibet, preparing to organize Tibetan forces and initiate an anti-Han Incident movement. In March 1912, the Dalai Lama issued a "Public Letter" through the Ganden Palace via the Kashag. The Kashag was the governing council of Tibet during the rule of the Qing  all the way to the 1950s. Following the release of this letter, the 13th Dalai Lama immediately formed a "Tibetan People's Army" of over ten thousand troops, deciding to use force to expel the Sichuanese army. The Tibetan forces first dealt with the Sichuan troops stationed in Yadong, Jiangzi, and Shigatse, and then besieged the Sichuan troops in Lhasa. Fearing being attacked from both within and outside, the Tibetan forces hastened to eliminate the Sichuan troops already within Tibet. The local Tibetan authorities also initiated an offensive against the region known as the Kham in the west of Sichuan. After 1939 this would be called Xikang, so to make things easier I will refer to it as such. The extensive eastward expansion of the Tibetan army shocked the entire nation, prompting military and political figures from Sichuan, Yunnan, and other areas to issue telegrams or contact the central government, demanding military action to quell the unrest and stabilize Tibet. In response to the chaotic situation in Tibet and Xikang, the Yuan Shikai government adopted a strategy of sending troops to suppress it. On May 25, 1912, Yuan Shikai issued an order for a westward expedition, and on June 14, the Beiyang government directed Governor of Sichuan,Yin Changheng to lead the troops westward. On July 10  Yin Changheng led 2,500 Sichuan troops westward from Chengdu. At the same time, Cai E also dispatched Yunnanese troops northward to meet the Sichuan army in Tibet. In August, the Sichuan army split into two routes: the southern route led by Zhu Senlin attacked Hekou, modern day Yajiang and Litang, defeating the Tibetan troops and capturing the key strongholds of Maguizong, Jianzibay, and Xie Luoluo, subsequently laying siege to Litang; the northern route was led by Liu Ruilin, who provided assistance to Chengdu and Batang. Meanwhile, the Yunnanese troops entered Tibet via the Nu River, capturing the gateway of Yanjing in northern Yunnan. At the end of August, Liu Ruilin attacked the eastern Tibetan stronghold of Chengdu. On September 3, Zhu Senlin's forces captured Litang and recaptured Gongjue, Sanyan, and Tongpu; shortly thereafter, the areas of Zhanhua, Baiyu, Daocheng, Xiangcheng, and Zha Ya also surrendered. On September 16, the western expeditionary army advanced westward from Chengdu, attacking Jiangda. By the end of September, the western expeditionary army had recovered all territories belonging to the late Qing dynasty's Sichuan-Yunnan border affairs department, except for the counties of Kema and Chayu in the southern route, and Dingqing represented by roughly 39 clans, Shobanduo, Lari, and Jiangda in the northern route.  On September 12, the Beijing government ordered the change of Jiangda in Tibet to Taizhou Prefecture, Lari to Jiali Prefecture, and Shobanduo to Shodu Prefecture. On the 25th, Yin Changheng was appointed as the pacification envoy at the Sichuan border, overseeing the Xikang region, which was divided into the eastern and western border areas, governing the six prefectures of Kangding, Lihua, Ba'an, Dengke, Chengdu, and Jiahe, as well as the two states of Dehua and Ganzi. Just as the western expeditionary army was achieving victory and preparing to enter Tibet from Kangding, the British colonial authorities publicly intervened, trying to prevent the expeditionary army from entering Tibet. Under British pressure, Yuan Shikai was forced to order the Sichuan and Yunnan armies to delay their advance, effectively halting their progress at the Nu River line. At the same time, the Beiyang government's policy towards Tibet shifted from suppression to pacification. Although the Sichuan and Yunnan armies ceased their military actions against Tibet, the significance of the western expedition was profound, as it enabled the central government to basically recover Xikang and played a significant role in curbing the British colonizers and Tibetan separatist forces, preventing Tibet from repeating the fate of Outer Mongolia. Thus ended the first period of conflict. What proceeded was known as the Simla Convention, we actually covered that event in some detail a long time ago in this series. More or less the convention divided Tibet into Outer and Inner Tibet, which also were referred to as U-Tsang and western Kham, ie: Xikang. With the support and assistance of Britain, the Tibetan local government gathered troops in Eastern Tibet to confront the Sichuan army, aiming to use military force to advance the control area of the Tibetan government to Dajianlu. In September 1917, two Tibetan soldiers from the Lhoka area invaded the Sichuan army's defense zone and were captured and sent to Chengdu by the border troops. After questioning by Commander Peng Risheng, it was made clear that the captured Tibetans would have to be detained. Tibet sent a letter to negotiate, requesting the return of the captured Tibetans, to be handled by Tibetan officials. Peng, without assessing the situation, executed the captured individuals and sent their heads back, which obviously infuriated the Tibetans, leading them to mobilize a large force to attack En and Lhoka. The British immediately supplied the Tibetan army with 5,000 quick-firing rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition to support a large-scale offensive against Enda County and Lhoka. By January 1918, Enda County had fallen, and the counties of Chaya, Ningjing, and Changdu were all under attack from the well-armed Tibetan army. In March, Ningjing County was lost, and the Chengdu garrison, who were quote “surrounded on all sides, though there was plenty of food in the city, had run out of ammunition.” In June, the Tibetan army captured Chengdu, and after accepting Peng Risheng's surrender, advanced rapidly eastward across the Ningjing Mountains and the Jinsha River, capturing the counties of Dege, Dengke, Shiqu, Baiyu, Gongxian, Wucheng, and Ningjing, until they were stopped by fierce fighting from the border troops at Ganzi.  On August 8, 1918, the Dalai Lama expressed his unwillingness to oppose what he called “the Chinese benefactor” but agreed to ceasefire negotiations. On August 21, a ceasefire agreement consisting of thirteen articles was reached in Chengdu among Liu Zanting, a representative of the Sichuan border troops, Jiangbadan, a representative of the Tibetan side, and a representative of the British government. They agreed that the Tibetan army would withdraw from the recently occupied counties of Zhanhua and Ganzi and return them to the Sichuan border, while the remaining occupied counties would be managed by Tibetan officials. They also agreed to a ceasefire for one year starting from October 17, 1918, awaiting a resolution to the Tibetan issue from the central government and the Dalai Lama. This “Thirteen-Article Agreement” effectively recognized the Tibetan army's occupation of the border areas in legal terms. After this, Chengdu and the aforementioned seven counties west of the Jinsha River came under the control of the Tibetan local government. Thus ended the second period of conflict.  Here we come to the year of 1930. Now a lot had occurred during the 1920’s. The Beiyang government had tried to maintain the indirect administrative structures of the former Qing Dynasty. In the absence of effective Chinese political control over Tibet, implementation of national policy fell onto regional actors, in this case Fu Zuoyi in Suiyuan and Liu Wenhui in Xikang. Along the Qinghai/Amdo frontier, Sino-Muslim leaders like Ma Bufang projected military authority from the provincial capital of Xining. Now a lot of what we are about to talk about revolves around a place called Yushu. Yushu is a mountainous region of the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau. The Tanggula Mountains form the southwestern boundary of Yushu, bordering Tibet. In the largely uninhabitable northwestern region of Yushu, you'll find the renowned Kekexili nature reserve and the railway connecting Xining to Lhasa. The main branch of the Kunlun Mountains, which splits Qinghai province into northern and southern regions, forms Yushu’s northern boundary, while a branch of the Kunlun range, the Bayanhar Mountains, defines its northeastern edge. Yushu is the source of three of Asia’s major rivers. The northeasternmost section of Yushu drains into the Yellow River as it flows towards Lanzhou, the capital of Gansu. Central and southeastern Yushu give rise to the headwaters of the Mekong and Yangzi, known locally as the Zhaqu and Tongtian rivers. The Qinghai provincial government emphasized the region's prominent topographical features—mountain ranges and river systems. Provincial reports meticulously described the mountain passes that link Yushu to key areas such as Lhasa, Chengdu in Xikang, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Xining, along with the challenging passes within Yushu. Yushu is a very difficult terrain for communication and transportation, quite the obstacle for governance. The journey between the provincial capital and Yushu totaled over 1620 li, a highway connecting such a path would not be built until 1944. A strong local governance was found in the form of Tibetan tribes known as the 25 peoples of Yushu. Yet the Qinghai provincial government sought to govern the land and those in Xining viewed Yushu as a barbarian region, where pastoral nomadism reigned. They would speak of Yushu as being an endless steppe inhabited by barbaric people who wandered aimlessly. Yushu had a complicated economic geography with monasteries occupying the richest land and concentrating monetary, spiritual, and political power on the local scale and pastoral tribes migrating in the areas in between. The monasteries acted as sites for periodic markets of trade, throughout Yushu. As much as they were Tibetan Buddhist monasteries for religious devotion, they were also landowners with powers of taxation. The hereditary tribal ladders of the 25 peoples of Yushu were thus a secondary network of political and economic authority in Yushu. The pastoral tribes who traversed the borderless region of Yushu, Xikang and Kham confused outsiders. The Beiyang government, as I have said, tried to simply adopt the former Qing policies. For Yushu they were ruling through an indirect system of local headmen. Each tribe determined their title, either company commander or battalion commander and were responsible for bi-annual taxes and periodic military conscription to the government in Xining. One of these tribal leaders, Cai Zuozhen, the leader of the Buqing tribe came from Huangyuan, lying between Xining and the Riyue mountains. His father worked as a translator for the Xining tribute tax collection missions. The 1920’s were continuous years of strife, especially between the tribes. No governing body really understood or had any real control over the region. In 1929 Yusuhu became an official county and on August 6th of that year, Ma Qi advocated an 8 point plan for calming her border problems. The plan included reconstructing a civilian government, promoting Tibetan Buddhism, opening more land for agriculture, training troops, establishing factories and mills, improving transportation and securing borders. He sought to implement all of this through the Yushu county government. However in the same year the Civil Affairs Bureau recommended adding 7 new counties some of which would carve chunks out of Yushu. The plan never materialized due to ongoing government difficulties, but remained on the table. In the meantime the government began a provincial level training program for self-government regions within Qinghai. 50 graduates came out of this program, none came from or were sent to Yushu. By the late 1920’s the region was being fought over by multiple parties for multiple reasons. There were 3 overarching reasons for why war would break out. Number 1 was because of the border disputes between Tibet and China. The Tibetans claimed areas inhabited by their people in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai and Sichuan were being ruled by warlords with loose connections to the Nanjing government. 2) There was a dispute between the 13th Dalai Lama and 9th Panchen Lama. To clarify the Panchen Lama is second to the Dalai Lama, to be more specific “the Panchen Lama is the reincarnation of Amithaba, the Buddha of Boundless Light, while the Dalai Lama is the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara (Chenrezig in Tibetan), the Buddha of Compassion. Traditionally, each acts as mentor to the other, and plays a key role in identifying the other's reincarnation”. Anyways the 9th Panchen Lama had been exiled and seen to be quite pro Chinese. 3) was the complex disputes of the people in regions like Yushu. Now the catalyst for the war was a chieftain from the town of Beri, which is in Yushu but is in an area claimed by Tibet, but under control of Sichuan. This chieftain whose name I cannot for the life of me find, seized items from the Targye Monastery. It is alleged the 9th Panchen Lama incited this action. The monks of the monastery rallied forces and took back the properties. The chieftain then asked for help from the governor of Sichuan, Liu Wenhui. Liu Wenhui unleashed forces into the area, forcing the Targye monks to ask for help from the Tibetan government who drove his men out. Thus began a series of clashes. The KMT Muslim official Tang Kesan was dispatched to negotiate an end to the conflict. Muslim General Ma Fuxiang, as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, sent a telegram instructing Tang Kesan to break the agreement with Tibet, fearing political rivals in Nanjing were exploiting the situation. In the following years, Tibetan forces launched repeated attacks on Liu Wenhui's troops but were defeated multiple times. In 1932, the Tibetans rallied 6000 troops along the Jinsha river, an area that acted as the boundary between Yushu and Xikang. In response to the Tibetan threat, in March the Qing government established the Qinghai Southern Border Region garrison under Ma Bufang. Two brigades deployed in Yushu; the first brigade was led by Ma Xun and the 2nd by Ma Biao. The Tibetans invaded, but only Ma Biao’s men were ready at the border as Ma Xun’s were still enroute from the provincial capital. At the time of the attack Ma Biao had one camp of cavalry, alongside some headquarters personnel for a combined total of 400 men. He dispatched his secretary Wang Jiamei to Tibet to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement. It is believe he did this simply to delay the enemy as he immediately telegrammed Ma Bufang for reinforcements, but they would not arrive until mid-june. On March 24th the Tibetans attacked Lesser Surmang, gradually forcing their way into southern Qinghai. After 8 hours of battle, both sides suffered tremendous casualties. During that night within the county seat of Jiegu, Ma Biao convened a conference attended by chieftains, merchants and important town leaders. At the meeting, Ma Biao asserted “our strength is sufficient to protect the lives and property of Yushu’s residents. Not only will we resist Tibetan incursions, but in the future we will tie our war horses at the gate of the Tibetan government compound!” However Ma Biao would find it quite difficult to make due on these promises. On March 26th, the Greater Surmang contingent of his forces met 500 Tibetans on the battlefield just southeast of Jiegu. As told to us by Cai Zuozhen “the Tibetans simply overwhelmed the undermanned provincial forces by at least five to one”. They retreated to a camp near Duolongduo where they quickly became surrounded by Tibetan forces. At the same time a detachment of other provincial forces at Lesser Surman, just 30 men were encircled by 100 Tibetans. The provincial forces continuously retreated in the face of an enemy 5-10 times larger than them. The Tibetans methodically seized territory heading north to encircle the county seat of Jiegu. At the same time a contingent of 300 troops from Xikang forded the Tongtian river to attack the monasteries at Labu and Xiewu situated on the two vital thoroughfares heading north to Jiegu. The Tibetans held a strong military position and in one incredible move sweeped and occupied all the areas surrounding Jiegu’s southern portion, severing the county seats communication with Xining. Jiegu was the site of Yushu’s county government and nominally held the headquarters of the southern Qinghai garrison, thus it was the key holding Xining’s position in the southern borderlands. Now outnumbered 10 to 1 by the Tibetans and with their communications severed, the situation for Xining and the Qinghai forces was quite dire. It seemed likely the Tibetans would shut the door, locking Xining out. The Southern Qinghai border region garrison, a mouthful to be sure, under Ma Biao were digging in for a long drawn out defense of the Yushu county seat while Xining went into a frenzy of actions. On April 19th, Ma Lin and Ma Bufang telegrammed the Military affairs commission in Nanjing with strong recommendations for improving the situation. They wanted to move the Southern Qinghai garrison roughly 20 li west of Jiegu and station a regiment between Jiegu and Xining at Daheba to protect the lines of communication. They also requested 2000 rifles, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 40,000 yuan and 5 wireless telegraphs. While this sounds like peanuts, but do remember Japan is currently full blown invading Manchuria. On the last day of april, Ma Bufang requested Ma Lin dispatch the Southern Qing Border Region garrison’s 1st brigade commander Ma Xun, cause everyone’s a Ma in this episode, to the southern front as Yushu’s Pacification Commissioner. He also again stated he wanted a peaceful settlement to the conflict. 4 days later, Ma Bufang and Ma Lin telegrammed Xi’an announcing Ma Xun’s appointment as “Yushu xuanwei shi”, the Yushu Pacification Commissioner. Yet it was not until May 24th, that Nanjing’s response reached Xining via Xi’an. Within the communique, Chiang Kai-Shek approved their suggestions and would meet their requests for military aid although at lower levels than requested. Only one wireless telegraph set was sent by Nanjing, but it dramatically improved communications.  On May 26th, Ma Xun departed Xining for Yushu with others stating “regardless of whether peace can be maintained, the communications route between the provincial capital and Jiegu must be protected at all costs”. Ma Xun departed with roughly a regiment of 100 troops, some provincial officials with Mongolian and Tibetan language skills, and a surveyor. Meanwhile Ma Bufang led another expeditionary force as far as Daheba, the site of a proposed garrison between Xining and Jiegu. Ma Xun’s Mongolian and Tibetan specialists had orders from Nanjing to visit Qinghai and awe the “barbarians” into loyalty to the new government by offering them doctors, dentists, botanists and anyone who could dazzle the “backward superstitious locals”.  For two months, Ma Biao and his men struggled to maintain Jiegu’s defenses, till finally on June 18th, Ma Xun’s group arrived. He would soon be followed up by 2 waves of reinforcements on August 20th and September 20th. Despite efforts made by Cai Zuozhen and other small contingents of Qinghai troops, the Tibetans simply have overwhelming numbers. The Qinghai troops however inflicted much more casualties upon them when they fought. A battle broke out on June 27th at the Changu Monastery, 5 li south of the county seat, where Qinghai forces led by Ma Biao defeated a Tibetan force twice their side who also enjoyed high ground advantage. The same forces also fought again near the Tongtian River due north of Jiegu where the Tibetans were forced to withdraw. It also seemed the Tibetans lacked adequate artillery, as was evident with their inability to take Jiegu. Many of the civilians within Jiegu noted the Tibetans fired over forty cannon rounds into the city, but none of the rounds exploded. On July 23rd, Ma Bufang dispatched a regiment led by La Pingfu to Yushu. Despite the combined forces of Ma Biao and Ma Xun engaging the Tibetans three times, they had still not seen the full strength of the Tibetans. There was a great concern on the Chinese side that the Tibetans were trying to lure as many in as possible before overwhelming them with numbers. Ma Bufang also dispatched reinforcements led by Ma Lu to the southern borderlands. On August 20th, La Pingfu arrived at Jiegu and freed the city of a Tibetan encirclement. La Pingfu’s troops were exhausted from the incredible 20 day march through insane terrain, they quickly took up defensive positions. This allowed the forces of Ma Biao and Ma Xun to depart south with 800 local militiamen to attack the Tibetans. They found Tibetans in the dead of night. The Qinghai forces used Dadao dui swords to hack them during hand to hand combat. The Tibetans dispersed, but reorganized themselves the next morning. The Qinghai forces took some high ground and met the counter attack, this time decisively defeating the Tibetans who suffered tremendous casualties. After four months, the Jiegu encirclement seemed to finally be broken. Afterwards the Qinghai forces formed three groups to advance south to retake lost territory. Ma Biao and Ma Xun led route armies while La Pingfu followed behind. Ma Bufang ordered a punitive mission against the local Tibetans, hoping they would simply withdraw from Yushu peacefully. He also ordered law and order to be brought back to the region. Military commanders were to gather local religious and political elites who could deal with the inevitable issues like refugee waves. To further push the Tibetans to pull out orders were mandated that medical care be given to wounded Tibetan soldiers with promises of funding for their return journey to Tibet as POW’s. Me Bufang also issued communiques to all the inhabitants of Yushu asking them to get their local leaders and militia to expel Tibetan soldiers, promising rewards. Cai Zuozhen’s reports differed greatly from Ma Bufang’s orders. Cai Zuozhen received reports for example that Ma Biao’s men routinely killed POW’s, attacked Tibetan civilians and robbed Tibetan merchants. Cai Zuozhen would go on the record to accuse Qinghai forces of burning entire villages, looting monasteries, raping women and even nuns. During this time folk songs emerged in Qinghai talking about bitter lives under the oppression of Xining overlords who conscripted soldiers, stole horses and property to feed themselves on “human soup” while the common people ate husks and chafe. It was often sung “the sun doesn’t rise in the Ma Family’s Qinghai” As the Qinghai troops continued advancing south they punished locals for helping Tibetans. One local headman in Nangqian who had helped Tibetans had 10,000 jin of Tsampa, 20,000 jin of barley, 3000 jin of yak butter, 200 head of cattle and 40 sheep commandeered by Ma Biao. Many headmen would be forced to give goods to Ma Xun, Ma Biao and La Pingfu, such things as pelts, antlers, horses and money. It was said Ma Biao took enough to be worth 2000 silver dollars from the nomads of Laxiu. During late August and early September, the Qinghai forces fought the Tibetans for the Surman region and the southeastern part of Yushu. They unleashed artillery on their enemy, trapping 2000 Tibetans soldiers into a confined area. They encircled them and systematically annihilated them, massacring 200. Little Surmang quickly came back under Xining’s control as the Tibetans fled to Greater Surmang. On September 2nd, La Pingfu led 300 men to occupy the rear exit of Greater Surmang. Despite a valiant defense led by two of Tibet's best generals, they suffered a string of defeats and were forced to relinquish Greater Surmang.  Then the third wave of reinforcements arrived from Xining, Ma Lu’s brigade who came to Jiegu on September 20th. This effectively solidified the Qinghai position. Ma Lu, Ma Xun, Ma Biao and Ma Biao all met south of Jiegu at Batang where they agreed they would set out for the Jinsha River which marked the border between Yushu and Xikang. There they would decisively defeat the enemy upon the western shore at Xidengke. At the Qingke monastery, facing the Dengke river, a major connecting point to Changde was the Tibetan powerbase in the region. The monastery’s defenses were very solid, 3 lines of over 5000 troops. On October 15th, the Qinghai artillery began raining hell upon the monastery as the infantry encircled the area. The Qinghai forces split their approaches attacking and moving while encircling. They were aided by Xikang troops who also bombarded the monastery from across the Jinsha river. The Tibetans could not withstand the joint attacks and gradually gave up their positions. The Qinghai and Xikang armies then connected across the river. Liu Wenhui led the Xikang forces and was communicating with Ma Bufang who ordered his forces to accept orders from the Xikang army.  Many historians believed Liu Wenhui had coordinated this joint military campaign against the Tibetans, taking advantage of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. It seems Liu Wenhui thought it was an opportune time to “solve the Tibet problem once and for all”, this would have been a hell of an escalation. Liu Wenhui sent word to Ma Bufang who notified Chiang Kai-Shek of their joint operation. However Chiang Kai-Shek demanded they halt hostilities and try negotiations with the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile the Dalai Lama received reports of their string of defeats and the loss of territory east of the Jinsha river, so he agreed to begin negotiations. What came from this was the Qinghai-Tibetan Peace Treaty, which more or less just set everything back to pre-war status quo. The Tibetans would never again pose a serious threat to Qinghai’s domination of Yushu. Yushu’s strategic passes would remain in Qinghais control well into the founding of the Peoples Republic of China. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. While it would appear as a major side quest in the greater scheme of things, the small war between Tibet and Sichuan was just another example of how not unified China still was. Despite all the grand claims, the new Nanjing government was still overseeing quite a fractured nation, who were about to face the full might of the Empire of the rising sun.